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Delayed financial disclosure: Mexico's recent experience
This article documents a delay in the public release of Mexican international reserve data in the months before Mexico's debt crisis at the end of 1994. The article establishes that in that year investors did not know the level of Mexican reserves before October; yet this lack of information did not seem to reduce investor confidence in the Mexican economy. The article does not establish whether the delay in releasing reserve data was due to logistical problems or to a government strategy. The possibility that the delay was strategic is evaluated by developing an economic model that captures ...
Learning to be unpredictable : an experimental study.
This study tests experimentally whether the ability of subjects to play a noncooperative game's mixed-strategy equilibrium (to make their play unpredictable) is affected by how much information subjects have about the structure of the game. Subjects played the mixed-strategy equilibrium when they had all the information about other players' payoffs and actions, but not otherwise. Previous research has shown that players of a game can play a mixed-strategy equilibrium if they observe the actions of all players and use sophisticated Bayesian learning to infer the likely payoffs to other ...
An experimental study of learning and limited information in games
We report on experiments that tested the predictions of competing theories of learning in games. Experimental subjects played a version of the three-person matching-pennies game. The unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game is locally unstable under naive Bayesian learning. Sophisticated Bayesian learning predicts that expectations will converge to Nash equilibrium if players observe the entire history of play. Neither theory requires payoffs to be common knowledge. We develop maximum-likelihood tests for the independence conditions implied by the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. ...