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Conference Paper
Bond market discipline of banks
Morgan, Donald P.; Stiroh, Kevin J. (2000)
Proceedings , Paper 687

Discussion Paper
Leverage Rule Arbitrage
Holcomb, Michael R.; Morgan, Donald P.; Choi, Dong Beom (2018-10-12)
Classic arbitrage involves the same asset selling at different prices; the leverage rule arbitrage we study here involves assets of different risk levels requiring the same amount of capital. The supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) rule, finalized by U.S. regulators in September 2014, requires a minimum ratio of capital to assets at the largest U.S. banks. The floor is higher for more systemically important banks, but not for banks with riskier assets. That non-risk-based aspect of SLR was intentional, since the leverage limit was meant to backstop (?supplement?) risk-based capital rules in ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20181012

Discussion Paper
Introducing a Series on Large and Complex Banks
Morgan, Donald P. (2014-03-25)
The chorus of criticism levied against mega-banks has, in some cases, outrun the research needed to back the criticism. To help the research catch up with the rhetoric, financial economists here at the New York Fed have engaged in a systematic study of the economics of large and complex banks and their resolution in the event of failure. The result of those efforts is a collection of eleven papers, each of which was subject to review (internal and external). The papers are now online in our Economic Policy Review. Today, we begin a two-week series of posts that present the key findings of ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 201404325b

Journal Article
What makes large bank failures so messy and what should be done about it?
Morgan, Donald P.; Yorulmazer, Tanju; Santos, Joao A. C.; McAndrews, James J. (2014-12)
This study argues that the defining feature of large and complex banks that makes their failures messy is their reliance on runnable financial liabilities. These liabilities confer liquidity or money-like services that may be impaired or destroyed in bankruptcy. To make large bank failures more orderly, the authors recommend that systemically important bank holding companies be required to issue ?bail-in-able? long-term debt that converts to equity in resolution. This reassures holders of uninsured liabilities that their claims will be honored in resolution, making them less likely to run. In ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Dec , Pages 229-244

Journal Article
The Federal Reserve's midyear monetary policy report to Congress
Morgan, Donald P. (1989-08)
Financial Letters , Issue Aug

Working Paper
Bank credit commitments and credit rationing
Morgan, Donald P. (1989)
Research Working Paper , Paper 89-06

Discussion Paper
Fear of $10 Billion
Yang, Bryan; Morgan, Donald P. (2016-10-03)
Ten billion has become a big number in banking since the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. When banks’ assets exceed that threshold, they face considerably heightened supervision and regulation, including exams by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, caps on interchange fees, and annual stress tests. There are plenty of anecdotes about banks avoiding the $10 billion threshold or waiting to cross with a big merger, but we’ve seen no systematic evidence of this avoidance behavior. We provide some supporting evidence below and then discuss the implications for size-based bank regulation—where ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20161003

Conference Paper
The changing mix of bank card borrowers and the rising rate of charge-offs
Black, Sandra E.; Morgan, Donald P. (1998)
Proceedings , Paper 594

Journal Article
New evidence firms are financially constrained
Morgan, Donald P. (1991-09)
Economic Review , Volume 76 , Issue Sep , Pages 37-45

Discussion Paper
Stress Test Success and Bank Opacity
Morgan, Donald P. (2011-05-25)
In contemplating the recent financial panic, it is easy to get lost in the weeds of repo markets and asset-backed securities and lose sight of the fact that, at the fundamental level, the panic was about inadequate information. Investors were uncertain about what particular assets were worth, and they were uncertain about which banks were exposed to those assets and to what degree. They were also uncertain about how the government would handle undercapitalized banks. It was against this background that the Treasury announced in February 2009 that the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20110525

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