New York and the politics of central banks, 1781 to the Federal Reserve Act
The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specifically, the authors highlight the role of New York banking interests in the legislations affecting the creation or expiration of central banking institutions. In our previous research we have detected that New York City banking entities usually exert substantial influence on legislation, greater than their large proportion of United States? banking resources. The authors describe how this influence affected the success or failure of central banking movements in the United States, and the authors use ...
Why didn't the United States establish a central bank until after the panic of 1907?
Monetary historians conventionally trace the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to the turbulence of the Panic of 1907. But why did the successful movement for creating a U.S. central bank follow the Panic of 1907 and not any earlier National Banking Era panic? The 1907 panic displayed a less severe output contraction than other national banking era panics, and national bank deposit and loan data suggest only a limited impairment to intermediation through these institutions. ; We argue that the Panic of 1907 was substantially different from earlier National Banking Era ...
Diversity and balanced growth: Tennessee stays on track
Private sector responses to the Panic of 1907: a comparison of New York and Chicago
The trend toward greater provision of payments services by nonbank providers raises a question for regulators: What if these nonbank institutions suffer unfavorable balances or experience a run? The authors of this article look to the Panic of 1907 as an example of how private market participants, in the absence of government institutions, react to a crisis in their industry. They suggest that New York's and Chicago's contrasting experiences during the panic may provide useful lessons for both regulators and market participants. ; The article compares responses to the panic by bank ...
Close but not a central bank: The New York Clearing House and issues of clearing house loan certificates
The paper examines the New York Clearing House (NYCH) as a lender of last resort by looking at clearing-house-loan-certificate borrowing during five banking panics of the National Banking Era (1863?1913). In that system, adequate aggregate liquidity provision was passive and dependent upon member bank borrowing. We document bank borrowing behavior using bank-level data for clearing-house loan certifi cates issued to NYCH member banks. The historical record reveals that the large New York City banks behaved in ways that resembled those of a central bank in 1884 and in 1890, but less so in the ...
The Transmission of the Financial Crisis in 1907: An Empirical Investigation
Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of financial crisis specifically focusing on the Panic of 1907, the final severe panic of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). We trace the transmission of the crisis from New York City trust companies to the New York City national banks through direct and indirect interconnections. Trust companies held cash balances at national banks, and these balances were liquidated as trust companies suffered depositor runs. Secondly, trust companies and national banks were notable creditors to the New York Stock Exchange; when ...
Poverty in the South