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Author:Miller, Robert A. 

Discussion Paper
Human capital, aggregate shocks, and panel data estimation

This paper analyses how the wage and employment decisions of females are affected by past workforce participation and hours supplied. Our estimation methods exploit the fact that, when markets are complete, the Lagrange multiplier for an agents lifetime budget constraint always enters multiplicatively with the prices of (contingent claims to) consumption and leisure. Depending on the properties of the equilibrium price process, it is thus possible to predict the behavior of a wealthy agent by observing that of a poorer person living in a more prosperous world. This provides the key to ...
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 47

Working Paper
Interlocked Executives and Insider Board Members: An Empirical Analysis

This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of governance problem or whether this problem is mitigated by implicit and market incentives. It then analyzes the role of independent board of directors. Empirically, we cannot reject the hypothesis that executives in companies with a large number of non-independent directors on the board receive the same expected compensation as other executives. In our model, every executive has an incentive to work. Placing more of ...
Working Papers , Paper 2015-40

Working Paper
Household choices in equilibrium

This paper investigates the role of aggregate shocks on household consumption and labor supply. It posits, estimates and tests a model where the equilibrium behavior of agents sometimes leads them to locate on the boundary of their respective choices sets. The framework is rich enough to nest much previous empirical work on life cycle labor supply and consumption based asset pricing. It also yields a structural interpretation of wage regressions on unemployment. An important feature of our model is that markets are complete. Consequently, aggregate shocks only enter through two price ...
Working Papers , Paper 341

Working Paper
Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

This paper investigates the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on CEO compensation, using panel data constructed for the S&P 1500 firms on CEO compensation, financial returns, and reported accounting income. Empirically SOX (i) changes the relationship between a firm?s abnormal returns and CEO compensation, (ii) changes the underlying distribution of abnormal returns, and (iii) significantly raises the expected CEO compensation in the primary sector. We develop and estimate a dynamic principal agent model of hidden information and hidden actions to explain these regularities. We find ...
Working Papers , Paper 2015-17

Journal Article
How Well Does Agency Theory Explain Executive Compensation?

As the share of all income going to the top 1 percent has risen over the past four decades, so has the share of top incomes coming from labor income relative to capital income. The rise in labor income is mainly due to the explosion in executive compensation over the same period?mostly because of the increase in executives being paid with stocks, options, and bonuses. The principal-agent model explains the reason for such compensation instead of a flat salary. Yet hundreds of papers in economics, finance, accounting, and management have reached no consensus on whether executive compensation ...
Review , Volume 100 , Issue 3 , Pages 201-36

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