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Author:Mikhed, Slava 

Working Paper
Reducing Strategic Default in a Financial Crisis

We document that increasing penalties for default reduces strategic default in financial crises by exploiting the 2009 changes to Canadian consumer insolvency regulations. Our novelty is that the incentives from increasing penalties for default operate in the opposite direction from incentives in more typical financial crisis policy interventions, which increase the liquidity of debtors. We can identify strategic default because our policy intervention is independent of debtors’ liquidity and initial selection into long-term debt contracts. Our results imply that even insolvent debtors can ...
Working Papers , Paper 21-36

Working Paper
Debtor Fraud in Consumer Debt Renegotiation

We study how forcing financially distressed consumer debtors to repay a larger fraction of debt can lead them to misreport data fraudulently. Using a plausibly exogenous policy change that required debtors to increase repayment to creditors, we document that debtors manipulated data to avoid higher repayment. Consistent with deliberate fraud, data manipulators traveled farther to find more lenient insolvency professionals who, historically, approved more potentially fraudulent filings. Finally, we find that those debtors who misreported income had a lower probability of default on their debt ...
Working Papers , Paper 22-35


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