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Author:Merlo, Antonio 

On the political economy of income redistribution and crime

We study a one-sector growth model which is standard except for the presence of an externality in the production function. The set of competitive equilibria is large. It includes constant equilibria, sunspot equilibria, cyclical and chaotic equilibria, and equilibria with deterministic or stochastic regime switching. The efficient allocation is characterized by constant employment and a constant growth rate. We identify an income tax-subsidy schedule that supports the efficient allocation as the unique equilibrium outcome. That schedule has two properties: (i) it specifies the tax rate to be ...
Staff Report , Paper 216

Working Paper
Understanding the determinants of crime

In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model where individuals are allowed to engage in both legitimate market activities and criminal behavior in order to assess the role of certain factors on the property crime rate. In particular, we investigate if any of the following could be capable of generating the large differences in crime rates that are observed across countries: differences in the unemployment rate, the fraction of low-human-capital individuals in an economy, the probability of apprehension, the duration of jail sentences, and income inequality. We find that small ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 0602

Pattern bargaining

Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining?a union determines a sequence for negotiations with firms within an industry where the agreement with the first firm becomes the take-it-or-leave-it offer by the union for all subsequent negotiations. In this paper, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industrywide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. In recent years, unions have increasingly moved away from patterns that equalized wage rates across firms when these patterns did ...
Staff Report , Paper 220

Working Paper
On the political economy of income redistribution and crime

A general equilibrium analysis of the effects of income redistribution and crime, showing that while expenditures on police protection reduce crime, it is possible for the crime rate to increase with redistribution.
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 9609

Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model

We interpret observed gender differences in education as the equilibrium outcome of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children conditional on gender. This model represents a new framework for the analysis of the process of intrahousehold decision making in an intergenerational setting.
Staff Report , Paper 195

Working Paper
What accounts for the decline in crime?

The authors? dynamic equilibrium model guides their quantitative investigation of the major determinants of property-crime patterns in the U.S. The model is capable of reproducing the drop in property crime that occurred between 1980 and 1996. The most important influences on the decline are a higher probability of apprehension, a stronger economy, and the aging of the population. The effect of unemployment on crime is negligible. Increased inequality in earnings prevented an even larger decline in crime. The authors? analysis can account for the behavior of the time series of property crime ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 0008



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