Search Results

Showing results 1 to 10 of approximately 15.

(refine search)
Author:Macchiavelli, Marco 

Working Paper
Endogenous Debt Maturity and Rollover Risk

We challenge the common view that short-term debt, by having to be rolled over continuously, is a risk factor that exposes banks to higher default risk. First, we show that the average effect of expiring obligations on default risk is insignificant; it is only when a bank has limited access to new funds that maturing debt has a detrimental impact on default risk. Next, we show that both limited access to new funds and shorter maturities are causally determined by deteriorating market expectations about the bank's future profitability. In other words, short-term debt is not a cause of ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2016-074

Pirates without Borders: The Propagation of Cyberattacks through Firms’ Supply Chains

We document the supply chain effects of the most damaging cyberattack in history. The disruptions propagated from the directly hit firms to their customers, causing a four-fold amplification of the initial drop in profits. These losses were larger for affected customers with fewer alternative suppliers. Internal liquidity buffers and increased borrowing, mainly through bank credit lines, helped firms navigate the shock. The cyberattack also led to persisting adjustments to the supply chain network, with affected customers more likely to create new relationships with alternative suppliers and ...
Staff Reports , Paper 937

Working Paper
Interest on Reserves and Arbitrage in Post-Crisis Money Markets

Currently, Eurodollars and fed funds markets combined trade about $220 billion in funds daily, the vast majority of which with overnight tenor. In this paper, we document several features of these wholesale unsecured dollar funding markets. Using daily confidential data on wholesale unsecured borrowing and reserve balances, we show that foreign banks, which make up most of the trading volumes in these markets, keep around 99% of each additional Eurodollar and 80% of each fed fund borrowed as reserve balances. With these risk-free trades, banks earn the spread between interest on reserves and ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-124

Working Paper
Emergency Collateral Upgrades

During the 2008-09 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve established two emergency facilities for broker-dealers. One provided collateralized loans. The other lent securities against a pledge of other securities, effectively providing collateral upgrades, an operation similar to activities traditionally undertaken by broker-dealers. We find that these facilities alleviated dealers' funding pressures when access to repos backed by illiquid collateral deteriorated. We also find that dealers used the facilities, especially the ability to upgrade collateral, to continue funding their own illiquid ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2018-078

Working Paper
Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries

We document several effects of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) rule on dealers' financing and intermediation of securities. For identification, we exploit the fact that the US implementation is more stringent than that in foreign jurisdictions. In line with LCR incentives, US dealers reduce their reliance on repos as a way to finance inventories of high-quality assets and increase the maturity of lower-quality repos relative to foreign dealers; additionally, US dealers cut back on trades that downgrade their own collateral. Dealers are nevertheless still providing significant maturity ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2018-084

Working Paper
The Political Origin of Home Bias: The Case of Europe

We show that politics is at the root of the banks-sovereign nexus that exacerbated the Eurozone crisis. First, government-owned banks or banks with politicians in the board of directors display higher home bias in sovereign debt compared to privately-owned banks throughout the 2010-2013 period. Second, only government-owned banks increased the home bias during the sovereign crisis (moral suasion). We exploit the fact that equity injections (bail-outs) by domestic governments were not directly targeted to politically connected banks to show that, upon receiving such assistance, only ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2016-060

Discussion Paper
The Impact of Natural Disasters on the Corporate Loan Market

Natural disasters are usually associated with an increase in the demand for credit by both households and companies in the affected regions. However, if capacity constraints preclude banks from meeting the local increase in demand, the banks may reduce lending elsewhere, thus propagating the shock to unaffected areas. In this post, we analyze the corporate loan market and find that banks, particularly those with lower capital, reduce credit provisioning to distant regions unaffected by natural disasters. We also find that shadow banks only partially offset the reduction in bank credit, so ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20201118

Discussion Paper
Cyberattacks and Supply Chain Disruptions

Cybercrime is one of the most pressing concerns for firms. Hackers perpetrate frequent but isolated ransomware attacks mostly for financial gains, while state-actors use more sophisticated techniques to obtain strategic information such as intellectual property and, in more extreme cases, to disrupt the operations of critical organizations. Thus, they can damage firms’ productive capacity, thereby potentially affecting their customers and suppliers. In this post, which is based on a related Staff Report, we study a particularly severe cyberattack that inadvertently spread beyond its ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20210622

Discussion Paper
Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis : Part I, Repo Runs

This is the first of two notes that empirically document the behavior of U.S. Primary Dealers during the 2007-08 financial crisis. In this note we show that dealers' exposure to risky assets drives the observed repo funding squeeze; moreover, as evident from Lehman's experience, we show that repos become subject to counterparty risk during periods of stress, even when collateralized by the safest assets.
FEDS Notes , Paper 2017-06-22-1

Discussion Paper
Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis : Part II, Intermediation and Deleveraging

In this second of two notes we study how dealers deleverage following the 2007-2008 funding squeeze.
FEDS Notes , Paper 2017-06-28


FILTER BY Content Type


FILTER BY Jel Classification

G21 5 items

G01 4 items

E58 2 items

G23 2 items

G24 2 items

D72 1 items

show more (11)

FILTER BY Keywords