Showing results 1 to 6 of approximately 6.(refine search)
Bank Capital Regulations Around the World : What Explains the Differences?
Despite the extensive attention that the Basel capital adequacy standards have received internationally, significant variation exists in the implementation of these standards across countries. Furthermore, a significant number of countries increase or decrease the stringency of capital regulations over time. The paper investigates the empirical determinants of the variation in the data based on the theories of bank capital regulation. The results show that countries with high average returns to investment and a high ratio of government ownership of banks choose less stringent capital regulation standards. Capital regulations may also be less stringent in countries with more concentrated banking sectors.
AUTHORS: Kara, Gazi
Policy Uncertainty and Bank Mortgage Credit
We document that banks reduce supply of jumbo mortgage loans when policy uncertainty increases as measured by the timing of US gubernatorial elections in banks' headquarter states. The reduction is larger for more uncertain elections. We utilize high-frequency, geographically granular loan data to address an identification problem arising from changing demand for loans: (1) the microeconomic data allow for state/time (quarter) fixed effects; (2) we observe banks reduce lending not just in their home states but also outside their home states when their home states hold elections; (3) we observe important cross-sectional differences in the way banks with different characteristics respond to policy uncertainty. Overall, the findings suggest that policy uncertainty has a real effect on residential housing markets through banks' credit supply decisions and that it can spill over across states through lending by banks serving multiple states.
AUTHORS: Kara, Gazi; Yook, Youngsuk
Bank regulation under fire sale externalities
This paper examines the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations in a model characterized by fire sale externalities. In the model, banks can insure against potential liquidity shocks by hoarding sufficient precautionary liquid assets. However, it is never optimal to fully insure, so realized liquidity shocks trigger an asset fire sale. Banks, not internalizing the fire sale externality, overinvest in the risky asset and underinvest in the liquid asset in the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can lead to less severe fire sales by addressing the inefficiency and reducing risky assets -- however, we show that banks respond to stricter capital requirements by decreasing their liquidity ratios. Anticipating this response, the regulator preemptively sets capital ratios at high levels. Ultimately, this interplay between banks and the regulator leads to inefficiently low levels of risky assets and liquidity. Macroprudential liquidity requirements that complement capital regulations, as in Basel III, restore constrained efficiency, improve financial stability and allow for a higher level of investment in risky assets.
AUTHORS: Kara, Gazi; Ozsoy, S. Mehmet
Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination
This paper examines the incentives of national regulators to coordinate regulatory policies in the presence of systemic risk in global financial markets. In a two-country and three-period model, correlated asset fire sales by banks generate systemic risk across national financial markets. Relaxing regulatory standards in one country increases both the cost and the severity of crises for both countries in this framework. In the absence of coordination, independent regulators choose inefficiently low levels of macro-prudential regulation. A central regulator internalizes the systemic risk and thereby can improve the welfare of coordinating countries. Symmetric countries always benefit from coordination. Asymmetric countries choose different levels of macro-prudential regulation when they act independently. Common central regulation will voluntarily emerge only between sufficiently similar countries.
AUTHORS: Kara, Gazi
Bank Failures, Capital Buffers, and Exposure to the Housing Market Bubble
We empirically document that banks with greater exposure to high home price-to-income ratio regions in 2005 and 2006 have higher mortgage delinquency and charge-off rates and significantly higher probabilities of failure during the last financial crisis even after controlling for capital, liquidity, and other standard bank performance measures. While high price-to-income ratios present a greater likelihood of house price correction, we find no evidence that banks managed this risk by building stronger capital buffers. Our results suggest that there is scope for improved measures of mortgage loan risk that could be considered for regulatory and risk management applications.
AUTHORS: Kara, Gazi; Vojtech, Cindy M.
Taxonomy of Studies on Interconnectedness
This note provides a taxonomy of existing studies in the literature on interconnectedness, focusing specifically on empirical measures.
AUTHORS: Kara, Gazi; Tian, Mary; Yellen, Margaret