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Author:Kahn, Charles M. 

Discussion Paper
Standing Repo Facilities, Then and Now

Recently there have been discussions, both within the FOMC and more broadly, about whether the FOMC should set up a standing repo facility. Such a facility would allow banks to sell safe assets (U.S. Treasury securities) to the Fed, with the assurance of subsequent repurchase, in unlimited quantities at an administered rate. This is not a new idea. In fact, a similar facility was implemented in 1683by the Bank of Amsterdam, the leading central bank of the time, and operated for more than a century afterward. In this article, we describe the motivations, operations, and limitations of the Bank ...
Policy Hub , Paper 2020-1

Journal Article
The Fed and Its Shadow: A Historical View

Central bank policies have always incorporated both a discretionary or active component and a passive component. Successful central banking has required a coordination of the two components. After a period of apparent dormancy, the passive component of monetary policy has emerged from the shadows and become relevant for Federal Reserve policy today.
Policy Hub , Volume 2023 , Issue 6 , Pages 32

Working Paper
The CLS Bank: a solution to the risks of international payments settlement?

Foreign exchange transactions are subject to a unique type of settlement risk. This risk ultimately stems from the difficulty of coordinating separate settlements in two different currencies. Settlement of foreign exchange transactions through the proposed CLS (?Continuous Linked Settlement?) Bank has been discussed as a potential solution to this problem. This paper describes the CLS proposal and analyzes the incentives it places on banks engaged in foreign exchange transactions. The analysis shows that while settlement through the CLS Bank may represent an improvement over current ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2000-15

Conference Paper
Housing-finance intervention and private incentives: helping minorities and the poor

Proceedings

Working Paper
A theory of transactions privacy

In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation will result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2000-22

Working Paper
Demandable debt as a means of payment: banknotes versus checks

We examine the question of whether transactable forms of privately issued, demandable debt are better used as "banknotes" or "checks." The distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use, whereas a banknote can circulate. We find that the answer to the question depends critically on the cost of early redemption. If this cost is small, banknotes will not circulate, so the question is moot. If this cost is large, incentive problems will prevent the issue of banknotes. For intermediate values of the early redemption cost, the option of early ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 98-5

Conference Paper
Payment system settlement and bank incentives

Proceedings , Paper 537

Conference Paper
On the role of bank coalitions in the provision of liquidity

Proceedings , Paper 590

Conference Paper
Project choice, moral hazard, and optimal subsidiary structure for intermediaries

Proceedings , Paper 409

Working Paper
On the efficiency of cash settlement

This paper investigates the question of why banks almost always settle payments in cash as opposed to debt. Our model suggests that adverse selection with respect to the quality of bank assets may be the primary motivation underlying this practice. Banks with higher-quality assets prefer not to exchange debt with other banks if their debt is indistinguishable from that of banks with lower-quality assets. Banks with higher-quality assets prefer to sell off assets to informed outside agents in return for cash, which can then be used in settlement. Willingness to settle in cash serves as a ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 95-11

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