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Author:Hong, Suting 

Working Paper
Competition, syndication, and entry in the venture capital market
There are two ways for a venture capital (VC) firm to enter a new market: initiate a new deal or form a syndicate with an incumbent. Both types of entry are extensively observed in the data. In this paper, I examine (i) the causes of syndication between entrant and incumbent VC firms, (ii) the impact of entry on VC contract terms and survival rates of VC-backed start-up companies, and (iii) the effect of syndication between entrant and incumbent VC firms on the competition in the VC market and the outcomes of incumbent-backed ventures. By developing a theoretical model featuring endogenous matching and coalition formation in the VC market, I show that an incumbent VC firm may strategically form syndicates with entrants to maintain its bargaining power. Furthermore, an incumbent VC firm is less likely to syndicate with entrants as the incumbent?s expertise increases. I find that entry increases the likelihood of survival for incumbent-backed start-up companies while syndication between entrants and incumbents dampens the competitive effect of entry. Using a data set of VC-backed investments in the U.S. between year 1990 and 2006, I find empirical evidence that is consistent with the theoretical predictions. The estimation results remain robust after I control for the endogeneity of entry and syndication.
AUTHORS: Hong, Suting
DATE: 2013-12-01

Working Paper
Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection.In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational advantage the current lender enjoys relative to its competitors determines interest rates, credit supply, and switching behavior. We evaluate the consequences of limiting the repricing of existing balances as implemented by recent legislation. Such restrictions increase deadweight losses and reduce ex ante consumer surplus. The model suggests novel approaches to identify empirically the effects of this law.
AUTHORS: Hunt, Robert M.; Hong, Suting; Serfes, Konstantinos
DATE: 2018-11-07

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