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Author:Covitz, Daniel M. 

Conference Paper
The extraordinary persistence of profits in the U.S. banking industry: a breakdown of the competitive paradigm?

Proceedings , Paper 581

Working Paper
Financial stability monitoring

While the Dodd Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, it limits the types of interventions by financial authorities to address systemic events when they occur. As a result, a broad and forward-looking monitoring program, which seeks to identify financial vulnerabilities and guide the development of pre-emptive policies to help mitigate them, is essential. Systemic vulnerabilities arise from ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2013-21

Discussion Paper
Financial Stability Monitoring

In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.
FEDS Notes , Paper 2014-08-04

Report
Financial stability monitoring

We present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track the sources of systemic risk over time and to facilitate the development of pre-emptive policies to promote financial stability. We offer a framework that distinguishes between shocks, which are difficult to prevent, and vulnerabilities that amplify shocks. Building on substantial research, we focus on leverage, maturity transformation, interconnectedness, complexity, and the pricing of risk as the primary vulnerabilities in the financial system. The monitoring program tracks these vulnerabilities in four areas: the banking ...
Staff Reports , Paper 601

Conference Paper
Are some bank managers issuing bonds to call attention to their banks, while other managers are hiding by not issuing?

Proceedings , Paper 814

Working Paper
Monitoring, moral hazard, and market power: a model of bank lending

We model the relationship between market power and both loan interest rates and bank risk without placing strong restrictions on the moral hazard problems between borrowers and banks and between banks and a government guarantor. Our results suggest that these relationships hinge on intuitive parameterizations of the overlapping moral hazard problems. Surprisingly, for lending markets with a high degree of borrower moral hazard but limited bank moral hazard, we find that banks with market power charge lower interest rates than competitive banks. We also find that competition makes banking ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 1999-37

Working Paper
Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform

We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2004-53

Working Paper
Securitization markets and central banking: an evaluation of the term asset-backed securities loan facility

In response to the near collapse of US securitization markets in 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which offered non-recourse loans to finance investors' purchases of certain highly rated asset-backed securities. We study the effects of this program and find that it lowered interest rate spreads for some categories of asset-backed securities but had little impact on the pricing of individual securities. These findings suggest that the program improved conditions in securitization markets but did not subsidize individual securities. We also find ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2011-16

Working Paper
Why are bank profits so persistent: the roles of product market competition, informational opacity, and regional/macroeconomic shocks

We investigate how banking market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to shocks have changed over the last three decades by examining the persistence of firm-level rents. We develop propagation mechanisms with testable implications to isolate the sources of persistence. Our analysis suggests that different processes underlie persistent performance at the high and low ends of the distribution. Our tests suggest that impediments to competition and informational opacity continue to be strong determinants of performance; that the reduction in geographic regulatory restrictions had ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 1999-28

Working Paper
An empirical analysis of bond recovery rates: exploring a structural view of default

A frictionless, structural view of default has the unrealistic implication that recovery rates on bonds, measured at default, should be close to 100 percent. This suggests that standard "frictions" such as default delays, corporate-valuation jumps, and bankruptcy costs may be important drivers of recovery rates. A structural view also suggests the existence of nonlinearities in the empirical relationship between recovery rates and their determinants. We explore these implications empirically and find direct evidence of jumps, and also evidence of the predicted nonlinearities. In particular, ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2005-10

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