A New Dataset of Macroprudential Policy Governance Structures
Governance structures are a critical part of a framework for implementing macroprudential policy, alongside methodologies for measuring and monitoring systemic risk, and analyses to understand the impact of policies that may be used to mitigate risk. As part of various research projects to study macroprudential policy frameworks, we have compiled a new dataset of governance structures in 58 countries. This note documents the construction of our dataset, including the decisions that we made concerning the countries and governance-structure facts to record in our dataset, and it discusses the ...
Cross-Border Bank Flows and Monetary Policy
We analyze the impact of monetary policy on bilateral cross-border bank flows using the BIS Locational Banking Statistics between 1995 and 2014. We find that monetary policy in the source countries is an important determinant of cross-border bank flows. In addition, we find evidence in favor of a cross-border bank portfolio channel. As relatively tighter monetary conditions in source countries erode the net worth and collateral values of domestic borrowers, banks reallocate their claims toward safer foreign counterparties. The cross-border reallocation of credit is more pronounced for banks ...
The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises
We propose a hypothetical distress insurance premium (DIP) as a measure of the European banking systemic risk, which integrates the characteristics of bank size, default probability, and interconnectedness. Based on this measure, the systemic risk of European banks reached its height in late 2011 around ? 500 billion. We find that the sovereign default spread is the factor driving this heightened risk in the banking sector during the European debt crisis. The methodology can also be used to identify the individual contributions of over 50 major European banks to the systemic risk measure. ...
How Do Liquidity Conditions Affect U.S. Bank Lending?
The recent financial crisis underscored the importance of understanding how liquidity conditions for banks (or other financial institutions) influence the banks' lending to domestic and foreign customers.
Revenge of the steamroller: ABCP as a window on risk choices
We empirically examine financial institutions' motivations to take systematic bad-tail risk in the form of sponsorship of credit-arbitrage asset-backed commercial paper vehicles. A run on debt issued by such vehicles played a key role in causing and propagating the liquidity crisis that began in the summer of 2007. We find evidence consistent with important roles for both owner-manager agency problems and government-induced distortions, especially government control or ownership of banks.
International banking and cross-border effects of regulation: lessons from the United States
Domestic prudential regulation can have unintended effects across borders and may be less effective in an environment where banks operate globally. Using U.S. micro-banking data for the first quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2013, this study shows that some regulatory changes indeed spill over. First, a foreign country?s tightening of limits on loan-to-value ratios and local currency reserve requirements increase lending growth in the United States through the U.S. branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. Second, a foreign tightening of capital requirements shifts lending by ...
Bank integration and financial constraints: evidence from U.S. firms
This paper uses data on publicly-traded firms in the U.S. to analyze the effect of interstate bank integration on the financial constraints borrowers face. A firm-level investment equation is estimated in order to test if bank integration reduces the sensitivity of capital expenditures to the level of internal funds. The staggered deregulation of cross-state bank acquisitions that took place in the U.S. between 1978 and 1994 helps estimate the model. Integration decreases financing constraints for bank-dependent firms. The change in firms' access to external finance is explained by an ...
Firm volatility and banks: evidence from U.S. banking deregulation
This paper exploits the staggered timing of state-level banking deregulation in the United States during the 1980s to study the causal effect of banking integration on the volatility of non-financial corporations. We find that firm-level employment, production, sales, and cash flows are less volatile after interstate banking deregulation, particularly for firms that have limited access to external finance. This finding suggests that bank-dependent firms exploit wider access to finance after deregulation to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks. In fact, short-term credit becomes less pro-cyclical ...
Owe a Bank Millions, the Bank Has a Problem: Credit Concentration in Bad Times
How does a bank react when a substantial share of its borrowers suffer a large negative shock? To answer this question we exploit the 2014 collapse of energy prices using the universe of Mexican commercial bank loans. We show that, after the drop in energy prices, banks exposed to the energy sector increased their exposure to these borrowers even more, relaxing credit margins to their larger debtors in the sector. An increase of one standard deviation in a bank's ex-ante exposure to the energy sector increased the loan volume to borrowers in the sector by 18 percent and reduced interest rates ...
International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector
Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees affects the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of rated banks and find that government support is associated with more risk taking by banks, especially prior and during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We also find that restricting banks? range of activities ameliorates the link between government support and bank risk taking. We conclude that strengthening market discipline by reducing bank complexity is needed to ...