The Fragility of an MMF-Intermediated Financial System
Since the financial crisis of 2007-09—and, in particular, the run on prime money market funds (MMFs) in September 2008—policymakers have been concerned that the funds’ fragility may render banks themselves more susceptible to risk. For instance, in a recent article and speech arguing in favor of MMF reform, New York Fed President Bill Dudley stated that MMF fragility may contribute to financial market systemic risk. The idea that the susceptibility of MMFs to runs may make the financial system more unstable seems intuitive, but is it correct? In this post, we show that the idea isn’t ...
Trading by Professional Traders: An Experiment
We examine how professional traders behave in two ﬁnancial market experiments; we contrast professional traders’ behavior to that of undergraduate students, the typical experimental subject pool. In our first experiment, both sets of participants trade an asset over multiple periods after receiving private information about its value. Second, participants play the Guessing Game. Finally, they play a novel, individual-level version of the Guessing Game and we collect data on their cognitive abilities, risk preferences, and conﬁdence levels. We ﬁnd three diﬀerences between traders and ...
The Eurodollar Market in the United States
In February, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's trading desk announced it will publish a new overnight bank funding rate early next year. The new rate will be based on both federal funds and Eurodollar transactions reported in a new data collection--the FR 2420 Report of Selected Money Market Rates. In a previous post, we explained how FR 2420 fed funds transaction data will replace brokered data as the base for the fed funds effective rate. This post provides insights on the Eurodollar market in advance of the publication of the overnight bank funding rate.
The New Overnight Bank Funding Rate
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York will begin publishing the overnight bank funding rate (OBFR) sometime in the first few months of 2016. The OBFR will be a broad measure of U.S. dollar funding costs for U.S.-based banks as it will be calculated using both fed funds and Eurodollar transactions, as reported in a new data collection?the FR 2420 Report of Selected Money Market Rates. In a recent post, ?The Eurodollar Market in the United States,? we described the Eurodollar activity of U.S.-based banks and compared recent fed funds and Eurodollar rates. Here, we look at the historical ...
Why Dealers Trade in GCF Repo®
In this post, the third in a series on GCF Repo, we describe dealers? trading strategies. We show that most dealers exhibit highly regular strategies, using the GCF Repo service either to borrow or to lend, on net, on almost all the days in which they are active. Moreover, dealers? strategies are highly persistent over time: Dealers that use GCF Repo to borrow (or to lend) in a given quarter are highly likely to continue to do so in the following quarter. Understanding how dealers trade in the GCF Repo market may provide insight about the role of the repo market more generally and about how ...
Borrowing, Lending, and Swapping Collateral in GCF Repo®
In the third post in this series, we examined GCF Repo traders? end-of-day strategies. In this final post, we further our understanding of dealers? behavior by looking at their trading pattern within the day.
Investigating the Proposed Overnight Treasury GC Repo Benchmark Rates
In its recent ?Statement Regarding the Publication of Overnight Treasury GC Repo Rates,? the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in cooperation with the U.S. Treasury Department?s Office of Financial Research, announced the potential publication of three overnight Treasury general collateral (GC) repurchase (repo) benchmark rates. Each of the proposed rates is designed to capture a particular segment of repo market activity. All three rates, as currently envisioned, would initially be based on transaction-level overnight GC repo trades occurring on tri-party repo platforms. The first rate would ...
Investors’ appetite for money-like assets: the money market fund industry after the 2014 regulatory reform
This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the premium investors are willing to pay to hold money-like assets. The 2014 SEC reform of the money market fund (MMF) industry reduced the money-likeness only of prime MMFs, by increasing the information sensitivity of their shares, and left government MMFs unaffected. As a result, investors fled from prime to government MMFs, with total outflows exceeding $1 trillion. By comparing investors? response to the regulatory change with past episodes of industry dislocation (for example, the 2008 MMF run), we highlight the difference between a ...
Endogenous Leverage and Default in the Laboratory
We study default and endogenous leverage in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model of collateralized borrowing amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the model, leverage is endogenous: agents choose how much to borrow using a risky asset as collateral, and there are no ad hoc collateral constraints. When the risky asset is financial?namely, its payoff does not depend on ownership (such as a bond)? collateral requirements are high and there is no default. In contrast, when the risky asset is nonfinancial?namely, its payoff ...
Money Market Funds and the New SEC Regulation
On October 14, 2016, amendments to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 2a-7, which governs money market mutual funds (MMFs), went into effect. The changes are designed to reduce MMFs? susceptibility to destabilizing runs and contain two principal requirements. First, institutional prime and muni funds?but not retail or government funds?must now compute their net asset values (NAVs) using market-based factors, thereby abandoning the fixed NAV that had been a hallmark of the MMF industry. Second, all prime and muni funds must adopt a system of gates and fees on redemptions, which can ...