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Forces shaping the payments environment: a summary of the Chicago Fed’s 2005 Payments Conference
Three main forces?innovations, incentives, and regulation?have affected the migration to more efficient payment mechanisms. Though several payment alternatives have been introduced recently, many have not been widely adopted. The Chicago Fed held a conference to explore why certain payment innovations have been more successful than others.
Working Paper
Consumer choice and merchant acceptance of payment media
We study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer's payment instrument choice. Consumers participate in payment card networks to insure themselves against three types of shocks -- income, theft, and their merchant match. Merchants choose which payment instruments to accept based on their production costs and increased profit opportunities. Our key results can be summarized as follows. The structure of prices is determined by the level of the bank's cost to provide payment services including the level of aggregate credit loss, the probability of theft, and the timing of ...
Journal Article
Why do we use so many checks?
The authors identify underlying disincentives for payment system participants to migrate to electronic payments. Their analysis sheds light on why check usage remains higher in the United States relative to other industrialized countries when the real resource cost of processing payments may decrease by using electronic payment networks.
Journal Article
Electronic bill presentment and payment--is it just a click away?
This article addresses the following questions about electronic presentment and payment (EBPP) in the business-to-consumer marketplace: Why aren't electronically presented bills always paid electronically? And, if EBPP does aid in the migration to fully electronic end-to-end payment, what are the barriers to its adoption.
Working Paper
Regulating two-sided markets: an empirical investigation
We study the effect of government encouraged or mandated interchange fee ceilings on consumer and merchant adoption and usage of payment cards in an economy where card acceptance is far from complete. We believe that we are the first to use bank- level data to study the impact of interchange fee regulation. We find that consumer and merchant welfare improved because of increased consumer and merchant adoption leading to greater usage of payment cards. We also find that bank revenues increased when interchange fees were reduced although these results are critically dependent on merchant ...
Discussion Paper
Who pays for credit cards?
We model side payments in a competitive credit-card market. If competitive retailers charge a single (higher) price to cover the cost of accepting cards, banks must subsidize convenience users to prevent them from defecting to merchants who do not accept cards. The side payments will be financed by card users who roll over balances at interest if their subjective discount rates are high enough. Despite the feasibility of cross subsidies among cardholders, price discrimination without side payments is Pareto preferred because of the costliness of the card network--unless banks have other ...
Working Paper
Why do banks reward their customers to use their credit cards?
Using a unique administrative level dataset from a large and diverse U.S. financial institution, we test the impact of rewards on credit card spending and debt. Specifically, we study the impact of cash-back rewards on individuals before and during their enrollment in the program. We find that with an average cash-back reward of $25, spending and debt increases by $79 and $191 a month, respectively during the first quarter. Furthermore, we find that cardholders who do not use their card prior to the cash-back program increase their spending and debt more than cardholders with debt prior to ...
Working Paper
Toward a theory of merchant credit card acceptance
In this article, we construct a two-period model to investigate what market conditions would support a credit card equilibrium given two commonly observed credit card pricing conventions consumers rarely are charged higher prices for using their credit cards and if they payoff their credit card obligations every month, they enjoy interest-free short-term credit. The results of the model indicate that when the card issuer's cost of funds is not too high and the merchant's profit margin is sufficiently high, a credit card equilibrium can exist. We also and that the credit-issuer's ability to ...
Journal Article
Payment instrument choice: the case of prepaid cards
The costs and benefits to payment system participants can differ depending on which payment mechanism is used. The authors specifically explore the costs and benefits of prepaid card applications versus other payment instruments, such as cash, checks, and debit cards, for certain payment segments, including gift, payroll, and employer-initiated and government benefit programs.