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Author:Carapella, Francesca 

Working Paper
Transparency and Collateral: The Design of CCPs' Loss Allocation Rules

This paper adopts a mechanism design approach to study optimal clearing arrangements for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by two types of agents: a borrower and lender. The borrower is subject to limited commitment and holds private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. The lender can acquire information at a cost about the commitment of the borrower, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. When truthful revelation by the borrower is not incentive compatible, the ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2019-058

Working Paper
A Simple Model of Voluntary Reserve Targets with Tolerance Bands

This note presents a simplifed version of the model of voluntary reserve targets (VRT) developed in Baughman and Carapella (forthcoming), with a Walrasian interbank market. First, the model makes transparent the role of target setting in controlling the market rate. Second, the simplicity of the model allows for an analysis of the interaction between VRT and tolerance bands, which are a common tool for controlling rate variability. We find that the persistent overshooting of interbank rates observed during the Bank of England's experiment with VRT may derive from the interaction between ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2019-060

Discussion Paper
Central Bank Digital Currency: A Literature Review

Technological advances in recent years have led to a growing number of fast, electronic means of payment available to consumers for everyday transactions, raising questions for policymakers about the role of the public sector in providing a digital payment instrument for the modern economy. From a theoretical standpoint, the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) raises long-standing questions relating to the provision of public and private money (Gurley and Shaw 1960), and the ability of the central bank to use CBDC as a means for transmitting monetary policy directly to ...
FEDS Notes , Paper 2020-11-09-1

Working Paper
Dealers' Insurance, Market Structure, And Liquidity

We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium structure of financial markets and its efficiency properties. We find that regulations aimed at improving market outcomes can cause inefficiencies. The welfare benefit of such regulation stems from endogenously improving market access for some participants, thus boosting competition and lowering prices to the ultimate consumers. Higher competition, however, erodes profits from market activities. This has two effects: it disproportionately hurts more efficient market participants, who earn larger profits, and it reduces the incentives of ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-119

Discussion Paper
Federal Funds Rate Control with Voluntary Reserve Targets

This note describes a framework for implementing monetary policy, dubbed a voluntary reserve targets framework, that could reintroduce significant margins in the federal funds market, reviving the market no matter the aggregate quantity of reserves, while simultaneously limiting the volatility of rates.
FEDS Notes , Paper 2019-08-26

Working Paper
Credit markets, limited commitment, and government debt

A dynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers? incentives. The provision of government debt acts to discourage default, whether default occurs in equilibrium or not.
Working Papers , Paper 2014-10

Working Paper
Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy

The events from the 2007?09 financial crisis have raised concerns that the failure of large financial institutions can lead to destabilizing fire sales of assets. The risk of fire sales is related to exemptions from bankruptcy's automatic stay provision enjoyed by a number of financial contracts, such as repo. An automatic stay prohibits collection actions by creditors against a bankrupt debtor or his property. It prevents a creditor from liquidating collateral of a defaulting debtor, since collateral is a lien on the debtor's property. In this paper, we construct a model of repo ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2012-15

Working Paper
Transparency and Collateral : Central versus Bilateral Clearing

Bilateral financial contracts typically require an assessment of counterparty risk. Central clearing of these financial contracts allows market participants to mutualize their counterparty risk, but this insurance may weaken incentives to acquire and to reveal information about such risk. When considering this trade-off, participants would choose central clearing if information acquisition is incentive compatible. If it is not, they may prefer bilateral clearing, when this choice prevents strategic default while economizing on costly collateral. In either case, participants independently ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2018-017

Working Paper
Banking panics and deflation in dynamic general equilibrium

This paper develops a framework to study the interaction between banking, price dynamics, and monetary policy. Deposit contracts are written in nominal terms: if prices unexpectedly fall, the real value of banks' existing obligations increases. Banks default, panics precipitate, economic activity declines. If banks default, aggregate demand for cash increases because financial intermediation provided by banks disappears. When money supply is unchanged, the price level drops, thereby providing incentives for banks to default. Active monetary policy prevents banks from failing and output from ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2015-18

Working Paper
A model of banknote discounts

Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes - dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally differed from the discounts quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A. ...
Working Papers , Paper 641

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