Report
Open-market operations in a model of regulated, insured intermediaries
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1978)
In ?The Inefficiency of Interest-Bearing National Debt,? (JPE, April 1979) we argued that private sector transaction costs are needed in order to explain interest on government debt. It follows that if the government?s transaction costs do not depend on its portfolio, then, barring special circumstances, an open-market purchase is deflationary and welfare improving. In this paper we show that this result can survive a potentially relevant special circumstance: reserve requirements which limit the size of insured intermediaries.
Staff Report , Paper 34

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Monetary policy in the presence of a stochastic deficit
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1979)
This paper presents a welfare analysis of monetary policy rules that differ as regards the extent to which monetary policy accommodates an exogenous, stochastic deficit. Examples show that a nonaccommodating rule, one involving a higher ratio of bonds to currency the higher the deficit, is not necessarily better than rules that accommodate: either a rule involving a constant ratio of bonds to currency or one involving a lower ratio of bonds to currency the higher the deficit. Moreover, the nonaccommodating rule can imply more variation in the price level than the accommodating rules.
Staff Report , Paper 42

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A comment on \\"implicit contracts and the underemployment equilibrium\\"
Bryant, John (1978)
Staff Report , Paper 35

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Transactions demand for money
Bryant, John (1978)
Staff Report , Paper 38

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Shocks, learning, and persistence
Bryant, John (1980)
A simple model of the process of learning in a diverse economy is presented. This model produces a stylized business cycle with shocks which precipitate the learning process. All agents have the same information, which implies that this business cycle cannot be reduced by improved information flow, counter to many models of output and employment fluctuation.
Staff Report , Paper 50

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Minimax-Nash
Bryant, John (1979)
An alternative solution concept is recommended for noncooperative games with multiple equilibra. Players maximize security level in a contracted game. Examples in economics are given in which this solution concept yields a unique solution: a fiat money model, the capital overaccumulation problem, and multiple rational expectations equilibria generally.
Staff Report , Paper 52

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A model of long-term contracts
Bryant, John (1980)
Long-term contracts are explained as equilibrium strategies of supergames. In the specific coherent general equilibrium model provided, limited mobility of labor, in the form of a fixed cost of moving, generates long-term contracts.
Staff Report , Paper 47

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Price setting 'perfect competitors'
Bryant, John (1977)
Staff Report , Paper 29

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Approximately complete markets: a generalization of the states of the world model
Bryant, John (1978)
Staff Report , Paper 33

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A suggestion for further simplifying the theory of money
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1980)
Our suggestion consists of three postulates: assets are valued only in terms of their payoffs, perfect foresight, and complete and costless markets under laissez-faire. Together these postulates imply that the crucial anomaly, rate-of-return dominance of ?money,? is to be explained by legal restrictions. ; Our defense of these postulates is two-fold. First we compare them with existing alternative theories. Second, we provide an illustrative model which : (a) is consistent with the postulates, (b) implies rate-of-return dominance under suitable legal restrictions, and (c) addresses monetary ...
Staff Report , Paper 62