Report
Transactions demand for money
Bryant, John (1978)
Staff Report , Paper 38

Report
Price setting 'perfect competitors'
Bryant, John (1977)
Staff Report , Paper 29

Report
The inefficiency of a nominal national debt
Bryant, John; Wallace, Neil (1977)
Staff Report , Paper 28

Report
A suggestion for further simplifying the theory of money
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1980)
Our suggestion consists of three postulates: assets are valued only in terms of their payoffs, perfect foresight, and complete and costless markets under laissez-faire. Together these postulates imply that the crucial anomaly, rate-of-return dominance of ?money,? is to be explained by legal restrictions. ; Our defense of these postulates is two-fold. First we compare them with existing alternative theories. Second, we provide an illustrative model which : (a) is consistent with the postulates, (b) implies rate-of-return dominance under suitable legal restrictions, and (c) addresses monetary ...
Staff Report , Paper 62

Report
The competitive provision of fiat money
Bryant, John (1980)
Herein, it is demonstrated that the competitive provision of fiat money is generically either inefficient or infeasible.
Staff Report , Paper 48

Report
A price discrimination analysis of monetary policy
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1983)
Monetary policy is analyzed within a model that ignores transaction costs and appeals solely to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain the coexistence of currency and interest-bearing default-free bonds. The interaction between such legal restrictions and monetary policy is illustrated in versions of overlapping generations models that contain three assets: government-issued currency and bonds and real capital. It is shown that legal restrictions and the use of both currency and bonds permit the government to levy a discriminatory inflation tax and that such a tax may be ...
Staff Report , Paper 51

Report
Shocks, learning, and persistence
Bryant, John (1980)
A simple model of the process of learning in a diverse economy is presented. This model produces a stylized business cycle with shocks which precipitate the learning process. All agents have the same information, which implies that this business cycle cannot be reduced by improved information flow, counter to many models of output and employment fluctuation.
Staff Report , Paper 50

Report
Demand management: an illustrative example
Bryant, John (1979)
This paper presents a simple coherent general equilibrium example in which optimal provision of a public good implies counter-cyclical government expenditure.
Staff Report , Paper 46

Report
Minimax-Nash
Bryant, John (1979)
An alternative solution concept is recommended for noncooperative games with multiple equilibra. Players maximize security level in a contracted game. Examples in economics are given in which this solution concept yields a unique solution: a fiat money model, the capital overaccumulation problem, and multiple rational expectations equilibria generally.
Staff Report , Paper 52

Report
Costly information and the stock market
Bryant, John (1980)
In a simple, coherent, general equilibrium model it is demonstrated why stock market prices do not reflect costly but socially useless information.
Staff Report , Paper 53