Search Results

Showing results 1 to 2 of approximately 2.

(refine search)
SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT
Author:Brancati, Emanuele 

Working Paper
The Role of Dispersed Information in Pricing Default: Evidence from the Great Recession
The recent Global Games literature makes important predictions on how financial crises unfold. We test the empirical relevance of these theories by analyzing how dispersed information affects banks' default risk. We find evidence that precise information acts as a coordination device which reduces creditors' willingness to roll over debt to a bank, thus increasing both its default risk and its vulnerability to changes in expectations. We establish two new results. First, given an unfavorable median forecast, less dispersed beliefs greatly increase default risk; this is consistent with incomplete information models that rely on coordination risk while in contrast with a wide range of models that neglect this component. Second, less dispersion of beliefs amplifies the reaction of default risk to changes in market expectations; importantly, precise information raises banks' vulnerability by more than standard measures of banks' fragility. Taken together, our results suggest that enhanced transparency, by providing agents with more precise information, increases banks' vulnerability to changes in sentiment and raises the default risk of weaker banks. Finally, we address concerns of endogeneity of market expectations by introducing a novel set of instruments.
AUTHORS: Brancati, Emanuele; Macchiavelli, Marco
DATE: 2015-08-13

Working Paper
Endogenous Debt Maturity and Rollover Risk
We challenge the common view that short-term debt, by having to be rolled over continuously, is a risk factor that exposes banks to higher default risk. First, we show that the average effect of expiring obligations on default risk is insignificant; it is only when a bank has limited access to new funds that maturing debt has a detrimental impact on default risk. Next, we show that both limited access to new funds and shorter maturities are causally determined by deteriorating market expectations about the bank's future profitability. In other words, short-term debt is not a cause of fragility but the result of creditors losing faith in the long-run prospects of the bank, hence forcing it to shorten its debt maturity. Finally, we build a model that endogenizes the debt maturity structure and predicts that worse market expectations lead to a maturity shortening.
AUTHORS: Brancati, Emanuele; Macchiavelli, Marco
DATE: 2016-09-09

FILTER BY year

FILTER BY Content Type

FILTER BY Author

FILTER BY Jel Classification

G01 2 items

G21 2 items

D83 1 items

G32 1 items

FILTER BY Keywords

PREVIOUS / NEXT