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Author:Boyd, John H. 

Working Paper
Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies

An equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory-of-value tradition is developed for a class of adverse selection economies and applied to the Spence signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies.
Working Papers , Paper 717

A case for reforming federal deposit insurance

Annual Report

Working Paper
Deposit insurance: a reconsideration

This paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls. We show that the central issue is how the government will make up any FDIC losses. Under one scheme for making up the losses, we show that FDIC policy is irrelevant: it does not matter what premium is charged, nor does it matter how big FDIC losses are. Under another scheme, all that matters is the magnitude of the losses. And there is no presumption that small losses are ?good.? We also show that ...
Working Papers , Paper 593

Conference Paper
Inflation, financial markets and capital formation

Proceedings , Volume 78 , Issue May , Pages 9-35

Working Paper
Are banks dead? or, are the reports greatly exaggerated?

Working Papers , Paper 531

Conference Paper
Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems

We study a monetary, general equilibrium economy in which banks exist because they provide inter-temporal insurance to risk-averse depositors. A "banking crisis" is defined as a case in which banks exhaust their reserve assets. This may (but need not) be associated with liquidation of a storage asset. When such liquidation does occur, the result is a real resource loss to the economy and we label this a "costly banking crisis." There is a monetary authority whose only policy choice is the long-run, constant rate of growth of the money supply, and thus the rate of inflation. Under ...

Journal Article
Inflation, financial markets and capital formation

Review , Volume 78 , Issue May , Pages 9-35

Journal Article
The role of large banks in the recent U.S. banking crisis

This article argues that the poor performance of the U.S. banking industry in the 1980s was due mainly to the risk-taking of the largest banks, which was encouraged by the U.S. government's too-big-to-fail policy. The article documents the recent trend toward riskier bank portfolios and the corresponding decline in bank profitability. A breakdown of the data by location and by asset size reveals that bank problems were concentrated in areas with troubled industries (oil, real estate, and agriculture) and among banks with the largest assets. In a statistical study controlling for location, ...
Quarterly Review , Volume 18 , Issue Win , Pages 2-21

Working Paper
Interest rate rules and nominal determinacy

Monetary economists have recently begun a serious study of money supply rules that allow the Fed to adjustably peg the nominal interest rate under rational expectations. These rules vary from procedures that produce stationary nominal magnitudes to those that generate nonstationarities in nominal variables. Our paper investigates the determinacy properties of three representative interest rate rules. ; We use Blanchard and Kahn's solution technique as a starting point. It doesn't directly apply, so we first modify their procedure. We then narrow the range of solutions by considering the ARMA ...
Working Paper , Paper 90-01

Working Paper
Organizations in economic analysis

Three economic environments are reviewed, and in each organizations play an essential role. For an adverse selection insurance economy, we find that when mutual insurance arrangements are permitted an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and the two others, illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenously.
Working Papers , Paper 385


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