Showing results 1 to 2 of approximately 2.(refine search)
Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-dependent pricing
The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers' credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should include an analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper, we examine how credibility affects the outcome of a disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price rigidity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, changes in the duration of price spells during disinflation play an important role in explaining the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially consider the costs of disinflation when the degree of credibility is fixed, and then allow agents to use Bayes' rule to update beliefs about the "type" of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. The pattern of the output response is more realistic in the case with learning.
AUTHORS: Bonomo, Marco; Carvalho, Carlos
State-dependent pricing under infrequent information: a unified framework
We characterize optimal state-dependent pricing rules under various forms of infrequent information. In all models, infrequent price changes arise from the existence of a lump-sum "menu cost." We entertain various alternatives for the source and nature of infrequent information. In two benchmark cases with continuously available information, optimal pricing rules are purely state-dependent. In contrast, in all environments with infrequent information, optimal pricing rules are both time- and state-dependent, characterized by "trigger strategies" that depend on the time elapsed since the last date when information was fully factored into the pricing decision. After considering the case in which information arrives infrequently for exogenous reasons, we address pricing problems in which gathering and processing information also entails a lump-sum cost. When the information and adjustment costs must be incurred simultaneously, the optimal pricing policy is a fixed-price time-dependent rule. When the costs are dissociated, the optimal rule features price stickiness and inattentiveness. Finally, we consider versions of the price-setting problems in which firms continuously entertain partial information. We characterize the optimal pricing rules and provide numerical solution algorithms and examples in a unified framework.
AUTHORS: Garcia, Rene; Carvalho, Carlos; Bonomo, Marco