The International Role of the U.S. Dollar
For most of the last century, the preeminent role of the U.S. dollar in the global economy has been supported by the size and strength of the U.S. economy, its stability and openness to trade and capital flows, and strong property rights and the rule of law. As a result, the depth and liquidity of U.S. financial markets is unmatched, and there is a large supply of extremely safe dollar-denominated assets.
Stockholding behavior of U.S. households: evidence from the 1983-89 Survey of Consumer Finances
Most households persistently invest in riskless assets but not stocks, and may do so because they perceive the information required for market participation to be costly relative to expected benefits. In a CCAPM, increased risk aversion, income risk, and lower resources reduce the information expense sufficient to deter stockholding. Bivariate probit analysis using the 1983-89 Survey of Consumer Finances shows that households with lower risk aversion, higher education, and greater wealth who were nonstockholders in 1983 had an increased conditional probability of entering by 1989, while 1983 ...
What makes investors over or underweight? explaining international appetites for foreign equities
Using data from the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys conducted in 2001, we analyze the determinants of 31 countries' international equity holdings. We show that investors in all countries underweight U.S. equities in their portfolios, many by more than they underweight foreign equities in general. Such behavior is surprising given the common perception of the United States as a desirable investment destination due to its well-developed legal and regulatory environment. Instead we find that investors in some countries are overweight in equities from other countries with which they ...
Recent developments in cross-border investment in securities
Securities have replaced bank lending in recent years as the primary means through which funds are invested internationally, and in the process, the share of U.S. securities owned by foreigners has grown markedly. Between 1974 and 2002, the proportion of the value of outstanding U.S. long-term securities (equities and long-term debt) that was foreign-owned increased from about 5 percent to about 12 percent. At the same time, U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities also increased, although their growth did not match the rapid growth in foreign holdings of U.S. securities. At $1.8 ...
Globalization and the Reach of Multinationals Implications for Portfolio Exposures, Capital Flows, and Home Bias
The residence-based framework of measuring international exposure is increasingly less informative, as a growing number of firms locate in low-tax jurisdictions and issue securities through offshore subsidiaries. This has clouded the view of capital flows and investor exposures from standard sources such as the IMF Balance of Payments and the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Estimating U.S. Cross-Border Securities Flows: Ten Years of the TIC SLT
The Treasury International Capital (TIC) system collects cross-border securities positions and transactions data and is the primary source of information on foreign official and private demand for U.S. Treasuries and other U.S. securities, as well as for U.S. investment in foreign securities. As noted in earlier work, though, the TIC system currently collects data separately on holdings of securities (the monthly TIC SLT and the annual SHL/SHC collections) and on transactions, the TIC S, and these two data streams can be difficult to reconcile, making interpretation of movements in the data ...
\"Fool Me Once . . . \" Did U.S. investors play it safer in the European debt crisis?
This paper examines U.S. investors? portfolio investment patterns since the global financial crisis, particularly since the European debt crisis that began in late 2009. The global financial crisis during 2007-2009 was accompanied by an increase in U.S. investors? home bias. U.S. investors experienced significant valuation losses and pulled back notably from their foreign investment, especially from foreign debt. In contrast, while they have also incurred sizable losses on cross-border investment during the European debt crisis, U.S. investors so far have not shown any increase in home bias, ...
The Replacement of Safe Assets: Evidence from the U.S. Bond Portfolio
The expansion in financial sector "safe" assets, largely in the form of structured products from the U.S. and the Caribbean, in the lead-up to the global financial crisis has by now been fairly well documented. Using a unique dataset derived from security-level data on U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities, we show that since the crisis, it is mostly the foreign financial sector that appears to have met U.S. demand for safe and liquid investment assets by expanding its supply of debt securities. We also find a strong negative correlation between the foreign share of the U.S. ...
The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem
The Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank at its center as well as the national central banks of the twelve countries currently participating in monetary union. The European Central Bank was established in July 1998, six months before the beginning of Stage Three of economic and monetary union. Although decisions regarding monetary policy are made centrally by the Governing Council of the Eurosystem, the operational aspects of monetary policy-including open market operations, administration of the minimum reserve system, and management of the standing facilities-are undertaken in a ...
ABS inflows to the United States and the global financial crisis
The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis argues that the surge in capital inflows from emerging market economies to the United States led to significant declines in long-term interest rates in the United States and other industrial economies. In turn, these lower interest rates, when combined with both innovations and deficiencies of the U.S. credit market, are believed to have contributed to the U.S. housing bubble and to the buildup in financial vulnerabilities that led to the financial crisis. Because the GSG countries for the most part restricted their U.S. purchases to Treasuries and ...