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Delphic and Odyssean Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Euro Area
We use financial intraday data to identify monetary policy surprises in the euro area. We find that monetary policy statements and press conferences after European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council meetings convey information that moves the yield curve far out. Moreover, the nature of the information revealed in a narrow window around these statements and press conferences evolved over time. Until 2013, unexpected variations in future interest rates were positively correlated with the changes in market-based measure of inflation expectations consistent with news on future macroeconomic conditions. That negative correlation disappeared roughly when forward guidance on future rates started to be given by the Governing Council. We use conditions on the joint reaction of expected interest rates and inflation rates to disentangle the two types of monetary policy shocks (i.e. the Delphic and Odyssean monetary policy surprise). A surprise that lowers future interest rates does not engineer a boom. A surprise that lowers future interest rates because it signals future accommodation does.
AUTHORS: Andrade, Philippe; Ferroni, Filippo
We use the term structure of disagreement of professional forecasters to document a novel set of facts: (1) forecasters disagree at all horizons, including the long run; (2) the term structure of disagreement differs markedly across variables: it is downward sloping for real output growth, relatively flat for inflation, and upward sloping for the federal funds rate; (3) disagreement is time-varying at all horizons, including the long run. These new facts present a challenge to benchmark models of expectation formation based on informational frictions. We show that these models require two additional ingredients to match the entire term structure of disagreement: First, agents must disentangle low-frequency shifts in the fundamentals of the economy from short-term fluctuations. Second, agents must take into account the dynamic interactions between variables when forming forecasts. While models enriched with these features capture the observed term structure of disagreement irrespective of the source of the informational friction, they fall short at explaining the time variance of disagreement at medium- and long-term horizons. We also use the term structure of disagreement to analyze the monetary policy rule perceived by professional forecasters and show that it features a high degree of interest-rate smoothing and time variation in the intercept.
AUTHORS: Moench, Emanuel; Crump, Richard K.; Andrade, Philippe; Eusepi, Stefano