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Author:Andrade, Philippe 

Working Paper
Delphic and Odyssean Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Euro Area
What drives the strong reaction of financial markets to central bank communication on the days of policy decisions? We highlight the role of two factors that we identify from high-frequency monetary surprises: news on future macroeconomic conditions (Delphic shocks) and news on future monetary policy shocks (Odyssean shocks). These two shocks move theyield curve in the same direction but have opposite effects on financial conditions and macroeconomic expectations. A drop in future interest rates that is associated with a negative Delphic (Odyssean) shock is perceived as being contractionary (expansionary). These offsetting effects can explain why central bank communication leads to a strongreaction of the yield curve together with a weak reaction by inflation expectations or stock prices. The two shocks also have different impacts on macroeconomic outcomes, such that central bankers cannot infer the degree of stimulus they provide by looking at the mere reaction of the yield curve. However, changes in their communication policy can influencethe way markets predominantly understand communication about future interest rates.
AUTHORS: Andrade, Philippe; Ferroni, Filippo
DATE: 2019-07-01

Working Paper
The Optimal Inflation Target and the Natural Rate of Interest
We study how changes in the steady-state real interest rate affect the optimal inflation target in a New Keynesian DSGE model with trend inflation and a lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In this setup, a lower steady-state real interest rate increases the probability of hitting the lower bound. That effect can be counteracted by an increase in the inflation target, but the resulting higher steady-state inflation has a welfare cost in and of itself. We use an estimated DSGE model to quantify that tradeoff and determine the implied optimal inflation target, conditional on the monetary policy rule in place before the financial crisis. The relation between the steady-state real interest rate and the optimal inflation target is downward sloping. While the increase in the optimal inflation rate is in general smaller than the decline in the steady-state real interest rate, in the currently empirically relevant region the slope of the relation is found to be close to –1. That slope is robust to allowing for parameter uncertainty. Under “make-up” strategies such as price level targeting, the requiredincrease in the optimal inflation target under a lower steady-state real interest rate is, however, much smaller.
AUTHORS: Andrade, Philippe; Le Bihan, Hervé; Matheron, Julien; Gali, Jordi
DATE: 2019-10-01

Working Paper
Delphic and Odyssean Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Euro Area
We use financial intraday data to identify monetary policy surprises in the euro area. We find that monetary policy statements and press conferences after European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council meetings convey information that moves the yield curve far out. Moreover, the nature of the information revealed in a narrow window around these statements and press conferences evolved over time. Until 2013, unexpected variations in future interest rates were positively correlated with the changes in market-based measure of inflation expectations consistent with news on future macroeconomic conditions. That negative correlation disappeared roughly when forward guidance on future rates started to be given by the Governing Council. We use conditions on the joint reaction of expected interest rates and inflation rates to disentangle the two types of monetary policy shocks (i.e. the Delphic and Odyssean monetary policy surprise). A surprise that lowers future interest rates does not engineer a boom. A surprise that lowers future interest rates because it signals future accommodation does.
AUTHORS: Andrade, Philippe; Ferroni, Filippo
DATE: 2018-07-26

Report
Fundamental disagreement
We use the term structure of disagreement of professional forecasters to document a novel set of facts: (1) forecasters disagree at all horizons, including the long run; (2) the term structure of disagreement differs markedly across variables: it is downward sloping for real output growth, relatively flat for inflation, and upward sloping for the federal funds rate; (3) disagreement is time-varying at all horizons, including the long run. These new facts present a challenge to benchmark models of expectation formation based on informational frictions. We show that these models require two additional ingredients to match the entire term structure of disagreement: First, agents must disentangle low-frequency shifts in the fundamentals of the economy from short-term fluctuations. Second, agents must take into account the dynamic interactions between variables when forming forecasts. While models enriched with these features capture the observed term structure of disagreement irrespective of the source of the informational friction, they fall short at explaining the time variance of disagreement at medium- and long-term horizons. We also use the term structure of disagreement to analyze the monetary policy rule perceived by professional forecasters and show that it features a high degree of interest-rate smoothing and time variation in the intercept.
AUTHORS: Moench, Emanuel; Crump, Richard K.; Andrade, Philippe; Eusepi, Stefano
DATE: 2013-12-01

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