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Author:Altinoglu, Levent 

Working Paper
The Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations in a Credit Network Economy

I show that inter-firm lending plays an important role in business cycle fluctuations. I first build a tractable network model of the economy in which trade in intermediate goods is financed by supplier credit. In the model, a financial shock to one firm affects its ability to make payments to its suppliers. The credit linkages between firms propagate financial shocks, amplifying their aggregate effects by about 30 percent. To calibrate the model, I construct a proxy of inter-industry credit flows from firm- and industry-level data. I then estimate aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2018-031

Working Paper
Information Externalities, Funding Liquidity, and Fire Sales

We develop a theory of learning in a model of fire sales and collateralized debt to study how beliefs about fundamentals are shaped by market conditions. Agents exchange short-term debt contracts to invest in a long-term risky asset, and receive shocks to the opportunity cost of funds (cost shocks) and news about the fundamental of the asset, both of which are private information. Asset prices play a dual role of clearing markets and conveying agents' private information, but markets are informationally inefficient: Agents can partially, but never fully, infer their counterparties' private ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2022-052

Working Paper
Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market

The concentration of risk within financial system is considered to be a source of systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions. We build a model of portfolio choice and endogenous contracts in which the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing financial claims to other institutions, relatively risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crisis in a privately optimal way, ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-098

Working Paper
Information Externalities, Funding Liquidity, and Fire Sales

We develop a theory of learning in a model of fire sales and collateralized debt to study how beliefs about fundamentals are shaped by market conditions. Agents exchange short-term debt contracts to invest in a long-term risky asset, and receive shocks to the opportunity cost of funds (cost shocks) and news about the fundamental of the asset, both of which are private information. Asset prices play a dual role of clearing markets and conveying agents' private information, but markets are informationally inefficient: Agents can partially, but never fully, infer their counterparties' private ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2022-052

Working Paper
A Theory of Safe Asset Creation, Systemic Risk, and Aggregate Demand

This paper presents a theory of safe asset creation and the interactions between systemic risk and aggregate demand. The creation of private safe assets by financial intermediaries requires them to take leverage, which generates a risk of future crisis (systemic risk) in which intermediaries liquidate assets to service their debt. In contrast, the creation of public safe assets by the government does not generate systemic risk as the government's power to tax allows it to better absorb losses. The level of systemic risk determines the neutral rate of interest through households' precautionary ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2023-062

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