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Conference Paper
The changing nature of debt and equity; a financial perspective
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin
DATE: 1989
Conference Paper
Competition and financial stability
Competition policy in the banking sector is complicated by the necessity of maintaining financial stability. Greater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability. From the point of view of welfare economics, the relevant question is: what are the efficient levels of competition and financial stability? We use a variety of models to address this question and find that different models provide different answers. The relationship between competition and stability is complex: sometimes competition increases stability.
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin; Gale, Douglas
DATE: 2004
Working Paper
Credit market competition and capital regulation
Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid off. Since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds. This implies that the capital requirement may not be binding, as recent evidence seems to indicate.
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin; Carletti, Elena; Marquez, Robert
DATE: 2006
Conference Paper
Commentary: the ‘big C”: identifying and mitigating contagion
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin
DATE: 2012
Conference Paper
The role of liquidity in financial crises
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin; Carletti, Elena
DATE: 2008
Journal Article
Commentary on Monetary policy and financial market evolution
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin
DATE: 2003
Working Paper
Universal banking, intertemporal risk smoothing, and European financial integration
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin; Gale, Douglas
DATE: 1995
Working Paper
Financial markets, intermediaries, and intertemporal smoothing
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin; Gale, Douglas
DATE: 1995
Working Paper
Enhancing prudential standards in financial regulations
The financial crisis has generated fundamental reforms in the financial regulatory system in the U.S. and internationally. Much of this reform was in direct response to the weaknesses revealed in the precrisis system. The new ?macroprudential? approach to financial regulations focuses on risks arising in financial markets broadly, as well as the potential impact on the financial system that may arise from financial distress at systemically important financial institutions. Systemic risk is the key factor in financial stability, but our current understanding of systemic risk is rather limited. While the goal of using regulation to maintain financial stability is clear, it is not obvious how to design an effective regulatory framework that achieves the financial stability objective while also promoting financial innovations. This paper discusses academic research and expert opinions on this vital subject of financial stability and regulatory reforms. Specifically, among other issues, it discusses the impact of increasing public disclosure of supervisory information, the effectiveness of bank stress testing as a tool to enhance financial stability, whether the financial crisis was caused by too big to fail (TBTF), and whether the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) resolution regime would be effective in achieving financial stability and ending TBTF.
AUTHORS: Lang, William W.; Jagtiani, Julapa; Allen, Franklin; Goldstein, Itay
DATE: 2014-12-03
Working Paper
The Interplay Among Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth
Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting more regulations in place with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and arbitrage opportunities through regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to become more concentrated in regulated entities and for other activities to move into new areas in the shadow banking system. How can we design an effective regulatory framework that would perfectly rule out bank runs and TBTF (too big to fail) and to do so without introducing incentives for financial firms to take excessive risk? It is important for financial regulations to be coordinated across regulatory entities and jurisdictions and for financial regulations to be forward looking, rather than aiming to address problems of the past.
AUTHORS: Allen, Franklin; Goldstein, Itay; Jagtiani, Julapa
DATE: 2018-02-16