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Author:Allen, Franklin 

Working Paper
On Interest Rate Policy and Asset Bubbles

In a provocative paper, Gal (2014) showed that a policymaker who raises interest rates to rein in a potential bubble will only make a bubble bigger if one exists. This poses a challenge to advocates of lean-against-the-wind policies that call for raising interest rates to mitigate potential bubbles. In this paper, we argue there are situations in which the lean-against-the wind view is justified. First, we argue Gal?s framework abstracts from the possibility that a policymaker who raises rates will crowd out resources that would have otherwise been spent on the bubble. Once we modify Gal?s ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2017-16

Working Paper
Credit market competition and capital regulation

Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2006-11

Conference Paper
Bank competition and the role of regulation

Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to ?monitoring? by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating a market-based incentive for banks to hold capital that stems purely from the asset side of the bank?s balance sheet. ...
Proceedings , Paper 977

Working Paper
Financial markets, intermediaries, and intertemporal smoothing

Working Papers , Paper 95-4

Working Paper
A welfare comparison of intermediaries and financial markets in Germany and the U.S

Working Papers , Paper 95-3

Working Paper
Universal banking, intertemporal risk smoothing, and European financial integration

Working Papers , Paper 95-6

Conference Paper
The role of liquidity in financial crises

Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole

Journal Article
Commentary on Monetary policy and financial market evolution

Review , Volume 85 , Issue Jul , Pages 27-30

Conference Paper
Competition and financial stability

Competition policy in the banking sector is complicated by the necessity of maintaining financial stability. Greater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability. From the point of view of welfare economics, the relevant question is: what are the efficient levels of competition and financial stability? We use a variety of models to address this question and find that different models provide different answers. The relationship between competition and stability is complex: sometimes competition increases stability.
Proceedings

Conference Paper
Commentary: the ‘big C”: identifying and mitigating contagion

Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole

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