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Author:Allen, Beth 

Discussion Paper
Equilibrium selections

This paper studies the outcome of fully insured random selections among multiple competitive equilibria. This defines an iterative procedure of reallocation which is Pareto improving at each step. The process converges to a unique Pareto optimal allocation in finitely many steps. The key requirement is that random selections be continuous, which is a generic condition for smooth exchange economies with strictly concave utility functions.
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 90

Implementation theory with incomplete information

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.
Staff Report , Paper 226

Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

This paper considers the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent for a game in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price, possibly using mixed strategies. Depending on the magnitudes of the fixed set-up cost, the cost of capacity, and the relative costs of production, the model produces a wide spectrum of equilibrium behaviors, including some not previously suggested in the literature. Interesting deterrence effects occur because firms need time to build. In contrast to much previous work, the incumbent may hold idle capacity ...
Staff Report , Paper 187

Cooperative theory with incomplete information

This paper surveys cooperative game theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially when the TU and NTU games are derived from economic models. First some results relating balanced games and markets are summarized, including theorems guaranteeing that the core is nonempty. Then the basic pure exchange economy is extended to include asymmetric information. The possibilities for such models to generate cooperative games are examined. Here the core is emphasized as a solution, and criteria are given for its nonemptiness. Finally, an alternative approach is explored ...
Staff Report , Paper 225

The existence of rational expectations equilibrium: a retrospective

This paper provides a selective review of theoretical research on the consistency of rational expectations equilibrium and its properties in microeconomic models. The general equilibrium framework is emphasized throughout the paper. After defining rational expectations equilibrium for a pure exchange economy, the paper presents a simple counterexample to illustrate that rational expectations equilibria need not exist. Results are summarized for the generic existence of fully revealing rational expectations equilibria in smooth economies satisfying additional dimensionality assumptions. Then ...
Staff Report , Paper 252


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