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Author:Afonso, Gara M. 

Discussion Paper
Who’s Lending in the Federal Funds Market?

The fed funds market is important to the framework and implementation of U.S. monetary policy. The Federal Open Market Committee sets a target level or range for the fed funds rate and directs the Trading Desk of the New York Fed to create ?conditions in reserve markets? that will encourage fed funds to trade at the target level. In this post, we use various publicly available data sources to estimate the size and composition of fed funds lending activity. We find that the fed funds market has shrunk considerably since the financial crisis and that lending activity is now dominated by one ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20131202

Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems

In large-value real-time gross settlement payment systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to finance outgoing payments. Such reliance necessitates a high degree of coordination and synchronization. We construct a model of a payment system calibrated for the U.S. Fedwire system and examine the impact of realistic disruptions motivated by the recent financial crisis. In such settings, individually cautious behavior can have a significant and detrimental impact on the overall functioning of the payment system through a multiplier effect. Our results quantify the mutually reinforcing nature ...
Staff Reports , Paper 352

Journal Article
Do \\"Too-Big-to-Fail\\" banks take on more risk?

The notion that some banks are ?too big to fail? builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of disorderly bank failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they expect future rescues. This article studies the effect of potential government support on banks? appetite for risk. Using balance-sheet data for 224 banks in forty-five countries starting in March 2007, the authors find higher levels of impaired loans after an increase in government support. To measure ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Dec , Pages 41-58

How do global banks scramble for liquidity? Evidence from the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007

We investigate how banks scrambled for liquidity following the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market freeze of August 2007 and its implications for corporate borrowing. Commercial banks in the United States raised dollar deposits and took advances from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), while foreign banks had limited access to such alternative dollar funding. Relative to before the ABCP freeze and relative to their non-dollar lending, foreign banks with ABCP exposure charged higher interest rates to corporations for dollar-denominated syndicated loans. The results point to a funding risk ...
Staff Reports , Paper 623

Discussion Paper
Size Is Not All: Distribution of Bank Reserves and Fed Funds Dynamics

As a consequence of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases from 2008-14, banks’ reserve balances at the Fed have increased dramatically, rising from $10 billion in March 2008 to more than $2 trillion currently. In that new environment of abundant reserves, the FOMC put in place a framework for controlling the fed funds rate, using the interest rate that it offered to banks and a different, lower interest rate that it offered to non-banks (and banks). Now that the Fed has begun to gradually reduce its asset holdings, aggregate reserves are shrinking as well, and an important ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20180711

Trading Partners in the Interbank Lending Market

There is substantial heterogeneity in the structure of trading relationships in the U.S. overnight interbank lending market: Some banks rely on spot transactions, while a majority form stable, concentrated borrowing relationships to hedge liquidity needs. Borrowers pay lower prices and borrow more from their concentrated lenders. When there are exogenous shocks to liquidity supply (days with low GSE lending), concentrated lenders insulate borrowers from the shocks without charging significantly higher interest rates.
Staff Reports , Paper 620

Discussion Paper
Who’s Borrowing in the Fed Funds Market?

The federal funds market plays an important role in the implementation of monetary policy. In our previous post, we examine the lending side of the fed funds market and the decline in total fed funds volume since the onset of the financial crisis. In today’s post, we discuss the borrowing side of this market and the interesting role played by foreign banks.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20131209

Liquidity and congestion

This paper studies the relationship between the endogenous arrival of investors to a market and liquidity in a search-based model of asset trading. Entry of investors causes two contradictory effects. First, it reduces trading costs, which attracts new investors (the externality effect). But second, as investors concentrate on one side of the market, the market becomes ?congested,? decreasing the returns to investing and discouraging new investors from entering (the congestion effect). The equilibrium level of liquidity depends on which of the two effects dominates. When congestion is the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 349

Discussion Paper
What Do Bond Markets Think about \\"Too-Big-to-Fail\\" Since Dodd-Frank?

As we discussed in our post on Monday, the Dodd-Frank Act includes provisions to address whether banks remain ?too big to fail.? Title II of the Act creates an orderly liquidation mechanism for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to resolve failed systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In December 2013, the FDIC outlined a ?single point of entry? (SPOE) strategy for resolving failing SIFIs that, in principle, should obviate bailouts. Under the SPOE, the FDIC will be appointed receiver of the top-tier parent holding company, and losses of a subsidiary bank will be ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20150701

Discussion Paper
Did the Dodd-Frank Act End ‘Too Big to Fail’?

One goal of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was to end ?too big to fail.? Toward that goal, the Act required systemically important financial institutions to submit detailed plans for an orderly resolution (?living wills?) and authorized the FDIC to create an alternative resolution procedure. In response, the FDIC has developed a ?single point of entry? (SPOE) strategy, under which healthy parent companies bear the losses of their failing subsidiaries. Since SPOE makes the parent company responsible for subsidiaries? losses, we would expect that parents have become riskier, relative to their ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20180305


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