Search Results
Working Paper
Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning
We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent's information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming technique in which information rent is the unique state variable. In the optimal contract, the optimal effort is front-loaded and decreases stochastically over time. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in ...
Working Paper
A sentiment-based explanation of the forward premium puzzle
This paper presents a sentiment-based explanation of the forward premium puzzle. Agents over- or underestimate the growth rate of the economy. All else equal, when perceived domestic growth is higher than perceived foreign growth, the domestic interest rate is higher than the foreign interest rate. At the same time, an econometrician would expect an increase in the home currency value. Together, the model with investor misperception can account for the forward premium puzzle.> ; In addition, it helps explain the low correlation of consumption growth differentials and exchange rate growth and ...
Working Paper
Lottery-related anomalies: the role of reference-dependent preferences
Previous empirical studies find that lottery-like stocks significantly underperform their nonlottery-like counterparts. Using five different measures of the lottery features in the literature, we document that the anomalies associated with these measures are statedependent: the evidence supporting these anomalies is strong and robust among stocks where investors have lost money, while among stocks where investors have gained profits, the evidence is either weak or even reversed. Several potential explanations for such empirical findings are examined and we document support for the explanation ...
Working Paper
Uncertainty, risk, and incentives: theory and evidence
Uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives. We study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard, where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort. Investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning, and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager. In contrast to the standard negative risk-incentive trade-off, this "learning-by-doing" effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives. We document empirical support ...