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Working Paper
Retaliation, liberalization, and trade wars: the political economy of nonstrategic trade policy
In this paper, we examine the dynamic process behind protection, retaliation, and trade wars. Consistent with empirical evidence on the development of trade policies, we model policy decisions as an outcome of political contests within two trading nations, rather than as an outcome of a strategic game between two governments. Uncertainty about the incidence and success of retaliation yields a dynamic political equilibrium in which one country imposes a tariff that increases gradually over time. Eventually, the cost of the tariff to the other country's exporting interests induces retaliation. ...
Journal Article
The theory and practice of free trade
David M. Gould, Roy J. Ruffin, and Graeme L. Woodbridge argue that free trade is supported both by economic principles and evidence from countries that have followed open market policies. The authors demonstrate that the countries whose markets are the most open have higher real output and economic growth. ; The authors show that many arguments for protection obscure the benefits countries derive from international trade. High-wage countries not only can compete with low-wage countries, they dominate the world economic stage. Trade deficits or surpluses are not inherently bad or good, but ...