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Working Paper
Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity
A principal is uncertain of an agent's preferences and cannot provide monetary transfers. The principal, however, does control the discretion granted to the agent. In this paper, we provide a simple characterization of when it is optimal for the principal to screen by offering different terms of discretion to the agent. When the principal's utility is sufficiently concave, it is optimal for the principal to pool and to offer all agents the same discretion. Thus, for any number of agents and any distribution over agent preferences, the optimal contract is simple: the principal sets a cap and ...
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Swing Pricing Calibration: A Simple Thought Exercise Using ETF Pricing Dynamics to Infer Swing Factors for Mutual Funds
This note uses pricing dynamics for exchange-traded funds that invest primarily in short-term debt to provide rough estimates of a range of swing-factor-proxies for mutual funds that invest in similar assets. These proxies could be useful for benchmarking stress-period swing factors in which mutual funds that invest substantially in short-term debt experience large net redemptions.