Working Paper
Non-par banking: competition and monopoly in markets for payments services
Stevens, Edward J. (1998)
Once the Federal Reserve Banks started providing par interbank funds transfers, their check collection service was unnecessary to bring nationwide par check collection in competitive banking markets. The survival of non-par banks probably reflected the absence of competition in the markets where they operated. The empirical evidence is consistent with this conclusion, since non-par banks typically were monopolists in isolated rural markets for banking services.
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 9817

Journal Article
Measuring the adjusted monetary base in an era of financial change - commentary
Stevens, Edward J. (1996-11)
Review , Issue Nov , Pages 38-44

Journal Article
Risk in large-dollar transfer systems
Stevens, Edward J. (1984-10)
An examination of the concept of settlement risk, a description of the large-dollar payment system in the U.S., and an explanation of the increased concern about settlement risk.
Economic Review , Issue Fall , Pages 2-16

Journal Article
Evolution in banking supervision
Stevens, Edward J. (2000-03)
Banking supervision must keep pace with technical innovations in the banking industry. The international Basel Committee on Banking Supervision currently is reviewing public comments on its proposed new method for judging whether a bank maintains enough capital to absorb unexpected losses. This Economic Commentary explains how existing standards became obsolete and describes the new plan.
Economic Commentary , Issue Mar

Working Paper
The founders' intentions: sources of the payments services franchise of the Federal Reserve banks
Stevens, Edward J. (1996)
The reserve banks check collection service was designed in 1913 to serve as "glue," attaching the new central bank to the commercial and financial markets through member banks. Successful creation and operation of the Federal Reserve System was thought to be more likely if the reserve banks could do more for member banks than lend occasionally and administer the reserve requirement tax. Initial drafts of the Federal Reserve Act would have allowed member banks to use required reserve deposits only for making interbank transfers. But correspondent banking relationships already provided ...
Financial Services working paper , Paper 96-03

Journal Article
The new discount window
Stevens, Edward J. (2003-05)
New regulations will change the way credit is rationed at the Federal Reserve's discount window. The Reserve Banks used to charge a below-market discount rate and rely on loan officers to restrict access to loans. Under the new system, the discount rate normally will be significantly higher than market rates, but loans will be available to any sound institution (which means most) at its discretion. This new arrangement eliminates any perception of a subsidy at the discount window. It also should prevent the actual fed funds rate from exceeding the discount rate so long as depository ...
Economic Commentary , Issue May

Journal Article
Comparing Central Banks' Rulebooks
Stevens, Edward J. (1992-07)
A central bank's daylight overdraft and reserve requirement rules
Economic Review , Issue Q III , Pages 2-15

Journal Article
Comparing central banks' rulebooks
Stevens, Edward J. (1992)
A comparison of Federal Reserve overdraft and reserve requirement rules with those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England, finding that no unique set of rules is necessary for effective performance of a central bank's monetary and payments system functions.
Economic Commentary , Volume 28 , Issue Q , Pages 2-15

Working Paper
Defining the monetary base in a deregulated financial system
Stevens, Edward J. (1995)
An examination of how the diminishing role of reserve requirements has made the monetary base a less useful measure of monetary policy than in previous years.
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 9514

Journal Article
The national debt: a secular perspective
Carlson, John B.; Stevens, Edward J. (1985-07)
An examination of the various factors that have determined the level and growth of the federal debt over the past 40 years, with some perspective on future levels of federal debt.
Economic Review , Issue Q III , Pages 11-24