Working Paper
Capital accumulation and foreign investment taxation
Sibert, Anne C. (1983)
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 218

Working Paper
Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles Anne Sibert
Sibert, Anne C.; Rogoff, Kenneth S. (1985)
There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycle in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 271

Working Paper
An analysis of the welfare implications of alternative exchange rate regimes: an intertemporal model with an application
Lebow, David E.; Sibert, Anne C.; Feltenstein, Andrew (1986)
We construct a two-period model of an open economy and use the model to analyze the welfare implications of fixed and floating exchange regimes. Consumers have perfect foresight and save by holding domestic and foreign bonds, which are chosen according to relative interest rates, deflated by the rate of devaluation of the domestic currency. The government produces a pure public good and finances its deficits by issuing money, domestic bonds, and by foreign borrowing. The government's bonds compete with private investment, which is entirely debt financed. Foreign exchange, i.e., foreign bonds, ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 273

Working Paper
The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information
Canzoneri, Matthew B.; Sibert, Anne C. (1984)
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 248

Working Paper
The risk premium in the market for forward foreign exchange
Sibert, Anne C. (1982)
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 211

Journal Article
Maintaining central bank credibility
Weiner, Stuart E.; Sibert, Anne C. (1988-09)
Central banks around the world potentially face a skeptical public when they announce a commitment to controlling inflation. Some economists have argued that, to enhance credibility, central banks should adopt monetary growth rules or other institutional arrangements. Yet it appears there are no costless solutions to the credibility problem.
Economic Review , Volume 73 , Issue Sep , Pages 3-15

Working Paper
Government finance in a common currency area
Sibert, Anne C. (1990)
Research Working Paper , Paper 90-09

Working Paper
The risk premium in the foreign exchange market
Sibert, Anne C. (1987)
Research Working Paper , Paper 87-07

Working Paper
Public finance and coordination problems in a common currency area
Sibert, Anne C. (1991)
Research Working Paper , Paper 91-06

Working Paper
Government finance in a model of currency substitution
Sibert, Anne C.; Liu, Lihong (1993)
Research Working Paper , Paper 93-09