Working Paper
Can unconventional preferences explain risk premia in the foreign exchange markets?
Sibert, Anne C. (1992)
Research Working Paper , Paper 92-02

Working Paper
Government finance in a common currency area
Sibert, Anne C. (1990)
Research Working Paper , Paper 90-09

Working Paper
Public finance and coordination problems in a common currency area
Sibert, Anne C. (1991)
Research Working Paper , Paper 91-06

Working Paper
The risk premium in the foreign exchange market
Sibert, Anne C. (1987)
Research Working Paper , Paper 87-07

Journal Article
Maintaining central bank credibility
Weiner, Stuart E.; Sibert, Anne C. (1988-09)
Central banks around the world potentially face a skeptical public when they announce a commitment to controlling inflation. Some economists have argued that, to enhance credibility, central banks should adopt monetary growth rules or other institutional arrangements. Yet it appears there are no costless solutions to the credibility problem.
Economic Review , Volume 73 , Issue Sep , Pages 3-15

Working Paper
An equilibrium model of spot and forward exchange rates
Sibert, Anne C.; Hakkio, Craig S. (1990)
Research Working Paper , Paper 90-02

Working Paper
The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information
Canzoneri, Matthew B.; Sibert, Anne C. (1984)
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 248

Working Paper
Strategic capital taxation in large, open economies with mobile capital
Sibert, Anne C.; Ha, Jiming (1992)
Research Working Paper , Paper 92-01

Working Paper
Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles Anne Sibert
Sibert, Anne C.; Rogoff, Kenneth S. (1985)
There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycle in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 271

Working Paper
Capital accumulation and foreign investment taxation
Sibert, Anne C. (1983)
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 218