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Working Paper
The Role of Government and Private Institutions in Credit Cycles in the U.S. Mortgage Market
The distribution of combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTVs) for purchase mortgages has been remarkably stable in the U.S. over the last 25 years. But the source of high-CLTV loans changed during the housing boom of the 2000s, with private securitization replacing FHA and VA loans directly guaranteed by the government. This substitution holds within ZIP codes, properties, and borrower types. Furthermore, the two groups exhibit similar delinquency rates. These findings suggest credit expanded predominantly through the increase in asset values rather than a relaxation of CLTV constraints, which ...
Report
Stressed, not frozen: the Federal Funds market in the financial crisis
We examine the importance of liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank market during the financial crisis of 2008. Our findings suggest that counterparty risk plays a larger role than does liquidity hoarding: the day after Lehman Brothers? bankruptcy, loan terms become more sensitive to borrower characteristics. In particular, poorly performing large banks see an increase in spreads of 25 basis points, but are borrowing 1 percent less, on average. Worse performing banks do not hoard liquidity. While the interbank market does not freeze entirely, it does not seem ...
Report
Trading Partners in the Interbank Lending Market
There is substantial heterogeneity in the structure of trading relationships in the U.S. overnight interbank lending market: Some banks rely on spot transactions, while a majority form stable, concentrated borrowing relationships to hedge liquidity needs. Borrowers pay lower prices and borrow more from their concentrated lenders. When there are exogenous shocks to liquidity supply (days with low GSE lending), concentrated lenders insulate borrowers from the shocks without charging significantly higher interest rates.