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Working Paper
Private money and banking regulation
We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank liabilities. Under perfect competition, a positive franchise value can be obtained only if the return on bank liabilities is sufficiently low, which imposes a cost on those who hold these liabilities for transaction purposes. If the banking system is monopolistic, then an efficient allocation is ...
Journal Article
The optimum quantity of money
A central premise of monetary policy in the U.S. throughout the first decade of the 21st century has been a firm commitment to avoid deflation. Indeed, it is the consensus view of policymakers and most economists. Nonetheless, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman proposed that optimal monetary policy should lead to a steady rate of deflation. For some economists, the Friedman rule is mainly a benchmark for thinking clearly about the assumptions underlying our models and a systematic guide for deciding how to modify our models, that is, a way of making scientific progress. However, it is not an ...
Working Paper
On the inherent instability of private money
A primary concern in monetary economics is whether a purely private monetary regime is consistent with macroeconomic stability. I show that a competitive regime is inherently unstable due to the properties of endogenously determined limits on private money creation. Precisely, there is a continuum of equilibria characterized by a self-fulfilling collapse of the value of private money and a persistent decline in the demand for money. I associate these equilibrium allocations with self-fulfilling banking crises. It is possible to formulate a fiscal intervention that results in the global ...
Working Paper
Optimal monetary policy in a model of money and credit
The authors study optimal monetary policy in a model in which fiat money and private debt coexist as a means of payment. The credit system is endogenous and allows buyers to relax their cash constraints. However, it is costly for agents to publicly report their trades, which is necessary for the enforcement of private liabilities. If it is too costly for the government to obtain information regarding private transactions, then it relies on the public information generated by the private credit system. If not all private transactions are publicly reported, the government has imperfect public ...
Journal Article
Shadow banking and the crisis of 2007-08
In recent decades, institutions that function much like traditional banks have grown outside regulatory oversight. Yet, as Daniel Sanches explains, these so-called shadow banks are as vulnerable to runs as regular banks. Because banking crises can inflict lasting economic harm, economists are interested in tracing how the panic ensued in the shadow system.
Journal Article
Central Bank Digital Currency: Is It a Good Idea?
A CBDC might make banking easier for you and me. It might also change how banks operate.
Working Paper
A Model of the Gold Standard
The gold standard emerged as the international monetary system by the end of the 19th century. We formally study its properties in a micro-founded model and find that the scarcity of the world gold stock not only results in a suboptimal output of goods that are purchased with money but also subjects the domestic economy of a country to external shocks. The creation of inside money in the form of private credit instruments adds to the money supply, usually resulting in a Pareto improvement, but opens the door to the international transmission of banking crises. These properties of the gold ...
Working Paper
Aggregate Liquidity Management
It has been largely acknowledged that monetary policy can affect borrowers and lenders differently. This paper investigates whether the distributional effects of monetary policy are an inherent feature of monetary economies with private credit instruments. In our framework, both money and credit instruments can potentially be used as media of exchange to overcome trading frictions in decentralized markets. Entrepreneurs have access to productive projects but face credit constraints due to limited pledgeability of their returns. Monetary policy affects the liquidity premium on private credit ...
Working Paper
Should Central Banks Issue Digital Currency?
We study how the introduction of a central bank-issued digital currency affects interest rates, the level of economic activity, and welfare in an environment where both central bank money and private bank deposits are used in exchange. Banks in our model are financially constrained, and the liquidity premium on bank deposits affects the level of aggregate investment. We study the optimal design of a digital currency in this setting, including whether it should pay interest and how widely it should circulate. We highlight an important policy tradeoff: while a digital currency tends to promote ...
Working Paper
On the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking
Superseded by Working Paper 15-20. Monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking, such as the ability to undertake more profitable (long-term) investment opportunities, and the difficulties associated with fractional reserve banking, such as the risk of insolvency for each bank. The goal of this paper is to show that a specific form of private bank coalition (a joint-liability arrangement) allows the members of the banking system to engage in fractional reserve banking in such a way that the solvency of each member bank is completely ...