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Working Paper
The transition from barter to fiat money
How did it become possible to exchange apparently valueless pieces of paper for goods? This paper provides an equilibrium account of the transition between barter and fiat money regimes. The explanation relies on the intervention of a self-interested government which must be able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money. To achieve credibility, the government must offset the benefits of seigniorage by internalizing some of the macroeconomic externalities generated by the issue of fiat money. The government's patience and the extent of its involvement in the economy are key determinants ...
Working Paper
Committing and reneging: a dynamic model of policy regimes.
Actual policy decisions are made in real time and are not irrevocable. These observations are mundane, but most policy modeling has neglected them. We show that when policy is made in an environment of uncertainty, costs of switching policies give the option to wait positive value. This insight has several implications: First, the option to wait itself makes the incumbent regime relatively more attractive (compared to the traditional once-and-for-all analysis). Second, the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes the incumbent regime more attractive. Third, because the commitment ...
Journal Article
An overstated headline
Working Paper
Feeding the national accounts
Modern market economies are probably the most complex institutions ever devised by human beings. In the United States, by far the most complex of these tracking systems is the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). This article's objective is to survey the main data sources currently used in the NIPA. It is not primarily an article about methodology, but focuses instead on the raw inputs to the process: Who is answering what kinds of questions? Closer acquaintance with the data sources behind the accounts highlights the considerable uncertainty about exact magnitudes of various ...
Journal Article
Search-theoretic models of international currency - commentary
Working Paper
Commitment as irreversible investment
Considering time inconsistency as a problem of irreversible investment brings some neglected points to the fore. Making a policy choice in real time and under current conditions emphasizes the importance of the timing of commitment, the regret over past decisions, and the option value of not committing. This paper applies these concepts to monetary policy, banking regulation, and capital taxation.
Journal Article
An outsider's guide to real business cycle modeling
Working Paper
Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules
An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.
Journal Article
Opening Pandora's box: the measurement of average wages
Working Paper
Economic models of employee motivation
Workers, being human beings, present employers with a range of tricky problems. Humans, unlike filing cabinets, can be crooked, subversive, surly, or indolent, even if they are paid on time. In this article we explore economists' main models of how compensation is used to address employee motivation and how these models help to explain puzzling features of the labor market.