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Working Paper
Theory of the firm: applied mechanism design
This paper studies the question: Why are there Firms? Motivated by observations of a variety of economies, several distinct concepts of what it means to be a firm are identified and then analyzed with mechanism design models. In the first class of models, a group of individuals is a firm if they collude and share information. This model is analyzed and compared with the non-firm alternative. Conditions are provided in which firms are preferred to no firms and vice versa. Next, we show how an economy with multiple distinct groups of colluding individuals can be decentralized. ; In the next ...
Briefing
Experimenting with contingent capital triggers
Contingent capital is debt that converts to equity when some triggering event occurs. It can automatically recapitalize a bank in distress, thus avoiding potentially costly failure. Unfortunately, little is known empirically about contingent capital regimes because there have been only a few issuances of contingent capital. Results from laboratory experiments suggest that contingent capital with price triggers would increase volatility of prices and the chance of mistakes in conversion decisions.Contingent capital is debt that converts to equity when some triggering event occurs. It can ...
Journal Article
Means of payment, the unbanked, and EFT '99
Working Paper
Banker compensation and bank risk taking: the organizational economics view
Models of banks operating under limited liability with deposit insurance and employee incentive problems are used to analyze how banker compensation contracts can contribute to bank risk shifting. The first model is a multi-agent, moral-hazard model, where each agent (e.g. a loan officer) operates a risky lending technology. Results differ from the single-agent model; pay for performance contracts do not necessarily indicate risk at the bank level. Correlation of returns is the most important factor. If loan officer returns are uncorrelated, the form of pay is irrelevant for risk. If returns ...
Working Paper
Incentives, communication, and payment instruments
Alternative payment instruments are studied in an economy with private information, delayed communication, and limited commitment. Attention is restricted to checks and bank drafts, which differ in resource cost and communication characteristics. Checks are less costly but settlement delays create a limited commitment constraint. We find that drafts dominate at low wealths and checks at higher wealths. Applications to 19th century and modern payment systems are discussed.
Journal Article
Reciprocal Deposits and the Banking Turmoil of 2023
Reciprocal deposits are deposits exchanged between banks to effectively increase deposit insurance coverage. Their use grew significantly during the banking turmoil of 2023. This Economic Commentary describes what they are, their connection to brokered deposits, how their legal treatment has changed over time, and which banks use them the most. It also discusses longer-run trends in uninsured deposits.
Working Paper
Computing moral-hazard problems using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
Linear programming is an important method for computing solutions to private information problems. The method is applicable for arbitrary specifications of the references and technology. Unfortunately, as the cardinality of underlying sets increases the programs quickly become too large to compute. This paper demonstrates that moral-hazard problems have a structure that allows them to be computed using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm. This algorithm breaks the linear program into subproblems, greatly increasing the size of problems that may be practically computed. Connections to ...
Working Paper
Federal Reserve Structure, Economic Ideas, and Monetary and Financial Policy
The decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System is evaluated as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on monetary and financial policy. The role of the Reserve Banks starting in the 1960s is emphasized. The introduction of monetarism in the 1960s, rational expectations in the 1970s, credibility in the 1980s, transparency, and other monetary policy ideas by Reserve Banks into the Federal Reserve System is documented. Contributions by Reserve Banks to policy on bank structure, bank regulation, and lender of last resort are also discussed. We argue that the Reserve Banks ...
Working Paper
Banker Compensation, Relative Performance, and Bank Risk
A multi-agent, moral-hazard model of a bank operating under deposit insurance and limited liability is used to analyze the connection between compensation of bank employees (below CEO) and bank risk. Limited liability with deposit insurance is a force that distorts effort down. However, the need to increase compensation to risk-averse employees in order to compensate them for extra bank risk is a force that reduces this effect. Optimal contracts use relative performance and are implementable as a wage with bonuses tied to individual and firm performance. The connection between pay for ...