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Working Paper
What was behind the M2 breakdown?
A deterioration in the link between the M2 monetary aggregate and GDP, along with large errors in predicting M2 growth, led the Board of Governors to downgrade the M2 aggregate as a reliable indicator of monetary policy in 1993. In this paper, we argue that the financial condition of depository institutions was a major factor behind the unusual pattern of M2 growth in the early 1990s. By constructing alternative measures of M2 based on banks and thrifts capital positions, we show that the anomalous behavior of M2 in the early 1990s disappears. Specifically, after accounting for the effect of ...
Journal Article
Evaluating the relative strength of the U.S. capital markets
Concern is growing that the U.S. capital markets are losing market share to overseas competitors. A decline in foreign initial public offerings indeed suggests that the U.S. equity market is becoming less attractive to certain issuers. However, evidence on the competitiveness of the U.S. equity market is mixed, since the trends affecting it are likewise shaping equity markets abroad. A less ambiguous decline in the share of global issuance can be seen in the U.S. corporate bond market, which is facing a growing challenge from the Eurobond market.
Journal Article
Pre-IPO financial performance and aftermarket survival
Many commentators have portrayed the tech boom of the late 1990s as an era of unprecedented deterioration in the quality of firms undertaking initial public offerings. But as far back as the early 1980s, firms seeking to go public were displaying signs of financial weakness, and the failure rate of issuers was on the rise. An analysis of the likelihood of failure among IPO firms in 1980-2000 suggests that pre-issue profitability is a good predictor of aftermarket survival.
Journal Article
Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure
The current review of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has put the spotlight on the ratios used to assess banks? capital adequacy. This article examines the effectiveness of three capital ratios?the first based on leverage, the second on gross revenues, and the third on risk-weighted assets?in forecasting bank failure over different time frames. Using 1988-93 data on U.S. banks, the authors find that the simple leverage and gross revenue ratios perform as well as the more complex risk-weighted ratio over one- or two-year horizons. Although the risk-weighted measures prove more accurate in ...
Journal Article
Credit, equity, and mortgage refinancings
Using a unique loan level data set that links individual household credit ratings with property and loan characteristics, the authors test the extent to which homeowners' credit ratings and equity affect the likelihood that mortgage loans will be refinanced as interest rates fall. Their logit model estimates strongly support the importance of both the credit and equity variables. Furthermore, the authors' results suggest that a change in the overall lending environment over the past decade has increased the probability that a homeowner will refinance.
Journal Article
Trends in financial market concentration and their implications for market stability
The link between financial market concentration and stability is a topic of great interest to policymakers and other market participants. Are concentrated markets - those where a relatively small number of firms hold large market shares - inherently more prone to disruption? This article considers that question by drawing on academic studies as well as introducing new analysis. Like other researchers, the authors find an ambiguous relationship between concentration and instability when a large firm in a concentrated market fails. In a complementary review of concentration trends across a ...
Journal Article
Are U.S. reserve requirements still binding?
Paper for a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entitled Financial Innovation and Monetary Transmission
Discussion Paper
Why Do Central Banks Have Discount Windows?
Though not literally a window any longer, the “discount window” refers to the facilities that central banks, acting as lender of last resort, use to provide liquidity to commercial banks. While the need for a discount window and lender of last resort has been debated, the basic rationale for their existence is that circumstances can arise, such as bank runs and panics, when even fundamentally sound banks cannot raise liquidity on short notice. Massive discount window borrowing in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack on the United States clearly illustrates the ...
Discussion Paper
The Dominant Role of Banks in Asset Securitization
As the previous posts have discussed, financial intermediation has evolved over the last few decades toward shadow banking. With that evolution, the traditional roles of banks as intermediaries between savers and borrowers are increasingly performed by more specialized entities involved in asset securitization. In this post, we summarize our published contribution to the series, in which we provide a comprehensive quantitative mapping of the primary roles in securitization. We document that banks were responsible for the majority of these activities. Their dominance indicates that the modern ...
Discussion Paper
Depositor Discipline of Risk-Taking by U.S. Banks
The recent financial crisis caused the largest rise in the number of bank failures since the unprecedented banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. This post examines how depositors responded to the amplified risks of bank failure over the last three decades. We show that uninsured depositors discipline troubled banks by withdrawing their funds. Focusing on the recent financial crisis, we find that banks experienced an outflow of uninsured time deposits after the near-failure of Bear Stearns and bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This depositor risk sensitivity subsided after the Federal ...