Search Results
Discussion Paper
Optimal Monetary Policy in a DSGE Model with Attenuated Forward Guidance Effects
In this article, we explore the implications of attenuating the power of forward guidance for the optimal conduct of forward guidance policy in a quantitative DSGE model of the U.S. economy.
Working Paper
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints
This paper studies optimal government spending and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound constraint in a stochastic New Keynesian economy. I find that the government chooses to increase its spending when at the zero lower bound by a substantially larger amount in the stochastic environment than it would in the deterministic environment. The presence of uncertainty creates a unique time-consistency problem if the steady-state is inefficient. Although access to government spending policy increases welfare in the face of a large deflationary shock, it ...
Working Paper
Conservatism and Liquidity Traps
Appointing Rogoff's (1985) conservative central banker improves welfare if the economy is subject to large contractionary shocks and the policy rate occasionally falls to the zero lower bound (ZLB). In an economy with occasionally binding ZLB constraints, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. A conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB, improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB ...
Working Paper
Monetary Policy Options at the Effective Lower Bound : Assessing the Federal Reserve's Current Policy Toolkit
We simulate the FRB/US model and a number of statistical models to quantify some of the risks stemming from the effective lower bound (ELB) on the federal funds rate and to assess the efficacy of adjustments to the federal funds rate target, balance sheet policies, and forward guidance to provide monetary policy accommodation in the event of a recession. Over the next decade, our simulations imply a roughly 20 to 50 percent probability that the federal funds rate will be constrained by the ELB at some point. We also find that forward guidance and balance sheet polices of the kinds used in ...
Working Paper
Effective Lower Bound Risk
Even when the policy rate is currently not constrained by its effective lower bound (ELB), the possibility that the policy rate will become constrained in the future lowers today's inflation by creating tail risk in future inflation and thus reducing expected inflation. In an empirically rich model calibrated to match key features of the U.S. economy, we find that the tail risk induced by the ELB causes inflation to undershoot the target rate of 2 percent by as much as 50 basis points at the economy's risky steady state. Our model suggests that achieving the inflation target may be more ...
Working Paper
Equilibrium Yield Curves and the Interest Rate Lower Bound
We study the term structure of default-free interest rates in a sticky-price model with an occasionally binding effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on interest rates and recursive preferences. The ELB constraint induces state-dependency in the dynamics of term premiums by affecting macroeconomic uncertainty and interest-rate sensitivity to economic activities. In a model calibrated to match key features of the aggregate economy and term structure dynamics in the U.S. above and at the ELB, we find that the ELB constraint typically lowers the absolute size of term premiums at the ELB and ...
Working Paper
Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We study optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. There is no straightforward recipe for enhancing welfare in this economy. Raising the inflation target or appointing an inflation-conservative central banker mitigates the inflation shortfall away from the lower bound but exacerbates deflationary pressures at the lower bound. Using government spending as an additional policy instrument worsens allocations at and away from the lower bound. However, appointing a policymaker who is ...
Working Paper
The potential role of subordinated debt programs in enhancing market discipline in banking
Previous studies have found that subordinated debt (sub-debt) markets do differentiate between banks with different risk profiles. This finding satisfies a necessary condition for regulatory proposals which would mandate increased reliance on sub-debt in the bank capital structure to discipline banks? risk taking. Such proposals, however, have not been implemented, partially because there are still concerns about the quality of the signal generated in current debt markets. We argue that previous studies evaluating the potential usefulness of sub-debt proposals have evaluated spreads in an ...
Journal Article
Has the behavior of inflation and long-term inflation expectations changed?
From 1975 to 1980, inflation in core (nonfood and nonenergy) consumer prices rose sharply as crude oil prices more than tripled. Yet, as crude oil prices quadrupled from late 2001 to 2007, core consumer price inflation remained essentially flat. Some observers have attributed the stability of consumer price inflation in the more recent episode to the influence of long-term inflation expectations. While inflation expectations rose significantly in the second half of the 1970s, they remained largely unchanged from 2001 through 2007. The increased stability of inflation and long-term ...
Working Paper
Credible Forward Guidance
We analyze credible forward guidance policies in a sticky-price model with an effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on nominal interest rates by solving a series of optimal sustainable policy problems indexed by the duration of reputational loss. Lower-for-longer policies---while effective in stimulating the economy at the ELB---are potentially time-inconsistent, as the associated overheating of the economy in the aftermath of a crisis is undesirable ex post. However, if reneging on a lower-for-longer promise leads to a loss of reputation and prevents the central bank from effectively using ...