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Working Paper
Predatory mortgage lending
Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders attenuates predatory lending. We use our ...
Working Paper
A portfolio view of consumer credit
This paper takes a portfolio view of consumer credit. Default models (credit-risk scores) estimate the probability of default of individual loans. But to compute risk-adjusted returns, lenders also need to know the covariances of the returns on their loans with aggregate returns. Covariances are independently relevant for lenders who care directly about the volatility of their portfolios, e.g., because of Value-at-Risk considerations or the structure of the securitization market. Cross-sectional differences in these covariances also provide insight into the nature of the shocks hitting ...
Working Paper
Predatory lending in rational world
Regulators express growing concern over ?predatory lending,? which we take to mean lending that reduces the expected utility of borrowers. We present a rational model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, and identify the circumstances in which it arises with and without competition. Predatory lending is associated with imperfect competition, highly collateralized loans, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders eliminates predatory lending.
Working Paper
Does junior inherit? Refinancing and the blocking power of second mortgages
Refinancing a first mortgage puts legal principles in conflict when other, junior, liens also exist. On one hand, the principle that seniority follows time priority leaves the new refinancing mortgage junior to mortgages that were junior to the original, refinanced first mortgage. On the other hand, the principle of equitable subrogation gives the refinancing mortgage the seniority of the claim it paid down. States resolve this tension differently, thus differentiating how much a second mortgage impedes refinancing of the first. We exploit this cross-state variation to identify the impact on ...
Working Paper
Concentration in Mortgage Markets: GSE Exposure and Risk-Taking in Uncertain Times
When home prices threaten to decline, lenders bearing more of a community’s mortgage risk have an incentive to combat this decline with new lending that boosts demand. We test whether this incentive drove the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to guarantee riskier mortgages in early 2007, as the chance of substantial declines grew from small to significant. To identify the effect we relate new risky lending to regional variation in the GSEs’ exposure and the interaction of this variation with home-price elasticity. We focus on the GSEs’ discretion across potential purchases by ...