Search Results
Report
Who Pays the Price? Overdraft Fee Ceilings and the Unbanked
Would capping overdraft fees increase financial inclusion? Studying an event in which caps were relaxed, we find banks raised overdraft fees but also expanded overdraft coverage and deposit supply, leading more low-income households to open accounts. While inattentive depositors may not benefit from being banked, the rise in account ownership persists, suggesting newly banked households valued their account even after learning about its costs. We find no evidence that being banked weakens households’ broader credit health, including delinquency, indebtedness, and credit scores. We conclude ...
Discussion Paper
Hold the Check: Overdrafts, Fee Caps, and Financial Inclusion
The 25 percent of low-income Americans without a checking account operate in a separate but unequal financial world. Instead of paying for things with cheap, convenient debit cards and checks, they get by with “fringe” payment providers like check cashers, money transfer, and other alternatives. Costly overdrafts rank high among reasons why households “bounce out” of the banking system and some observers have advocated capping overdraft fees to promote inclusion. Our recent paper finds unintended (if predictable) effects of overdraft fee caps. Studying a case where fee caps were ...
Working Paper
Do Household Finances Constrain Unconventional Fiscal Policy?
When the zero lower bound on nominal interest rate binds, monetary policy makers may lack traditional tools to stimulate aggregate demand. We investigate whether ?unconventional? fiscal policy, in the form of pre-announced consumption tax changes, has the potential to meaningfully shift durables purchases intertemporally and how it is affected by consumer credit. In particular, we test whether car sales react in anticipation of future sales tax changes, leveraging 57 pre-announced changes in state sales tax rates from 1999-2017. We find evidence for substantial tax elasticities, with car ...
Report
Price-increasing competition: the curious case of overdraft versus deferred deposit credit
We find that banks charge more for overdraft credit when depositors have access to a potential substitute: deferred deposit ("payday") credit. We attribute this rise in prices partly to adverse selection created by banks' practice of charging a flat fee regardless of the overdraft amount--pricing that favors depositors prone to large overdrafts. When deferred deposit credit priced per dollar borrowed is available, depositors prone to small overdrafts switch to that option. That selection works against banks; large overdrafts cost more to supply and, if depositors default, banks lose more, ...