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Author:Mason, Joseph R. 

Conference Paper
Causes of U.S. bank distress during the depression

Proceedings , Paper 714

Working Paper
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the 1937-38 Recession? New Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Requirements on Bank Reserve Demand and Lending

In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks' reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937-38. Using a new database on individual banks, we show that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks' reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.
Working Papers , Paper 2022-011

Conference Paper
Why ABS and CDO rating substantially differ from corporate bond rating

Proceedings , Paper 1073

Working Paper
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the 1937-38 Recession? New Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Requirements on Bank Reserve Demand and Lending

In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks' reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937-38. Using a new database on individual banks, we show that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks' reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.
Working Papers , Paper 2022-011

Journal Article
American banks during the Great Depression: a new research agenda

Review , Issue May

Working Paper
Credit card securitization and regulatory arbitrage

This paper explores the motivations and desirability of off-balance-sheet financing of credit card receivables by banks. We explore three related issues: the degree to which securitizations result in the transfer of risk out of the originating bank, the extent to which securitization permits banks to economize on capital by avoiding regulatory minimum capital requirements, and whether banks' avoidance of minimum capital regulation through securitization with implicit recourse has been undesirable from a regulatory standpoint. We show that this intermediation structure could be motivated ...
Working Papers , Paper 03-7

Conference Paper
Contagion and bank failures during the Great Depression: the June 1932 Chicago banking panic.

Proceedings , Paper 451

Working Paper
What is the value of recourse to asset backed securities? A clinical study of credit card banks

The present paper uses data from revolving credit card securitizations to show that, conditional on being in a position where implicit recourse has become necessary and actually providing that recourse, recourse to securitized debt may benefit short- and long-term stock returns, and long-term operating performance of sponsors. The paper suggests that this result may come about because those sponsors providing the recourse do not seem to be extreme default or insolvency risks. However, sponsors providing recourse do experience an abnormal delay in their normal issuance cycle around the event. ...
Working Papers , Paper 03-6

Conference Paper
The speed of bank liquidation and the propagation of the U.S. Great Depression

Proceedings , Paper 683

Working Paper
Did doubling reserve requirements cause the recession of 1937-1938? a microeconomic approach

In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled the reserve requirements imposed on member banks. Ever since, the question of whether the doubling of reserve requirements increased reserve demand and produced a contraction of money and credit, and thereby helped to cause the recession of 1937-1938, has been a matter of controversy. Using microeconomic data to gauge the fundamental reserve demands of Fed member banks, we find that despite being doubled, reserve requirements were not binding on bank reserve demand in 1936 and 1937, and therefore could not have produced a significant contraction in the ...
Working Papers , Paper 2011-002

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