Working Paper
A positive analysis of bank closure
Mester, Loretta J.; Mailath, George J. (1993)
Working Papers , Paper 93-10/R

Working Paper
When do regulators close banks? When should they?
Mester, Loretta J.; Mailath, George J. (1993)
Working Papers , Paper 93-10

Working Paper
A positive analysis of bank closure
Mester, Loretta J.; Mailath, George J. (1993)
Working Papers , Paper 94-2

Report
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms
Cole, Harold L.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Mailath, George J. (1996)
We analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people. In this model, self-enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition. However, the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose. We demonstrate that in such cases, it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes, with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower.
Staff Report , Paper 213

Working Paper
When do regulators close banks? When should they?
Mester, Loretta J.; Mailath, George J. (1991)
Working Papers , Paper 91-24

Report
Efficient non-contractible investments
Cole, Harold L.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Mailath, George J. (1998)
This paper addresses the question of whether agents will invest efficiently in attributes that will increase their productivity in subsequent matches with other individuals. We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investment decisions prior to a matching stage. Once matched, the buyer and seller bargain over the transfer price. In contrast to most matching models, preferences over possible matches are affected by decisions made before the matching process. We show that if bargaining respects the existence of outside options (in the sense that the resulting ...
Staff Report , Paper 253

Journal Article
Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models
Cole, Harold L.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Mailath, George J. (1995-07)
This article develops a simple model that captures a concern for relative standing, or status. This concern is instrumental, in the sense that individuals do not get utility directly from their relative standing, but, rather, the concern is induced because their relative standing affects their consumption of standard commodities. The article investigates the consequences of a concern for relative wealth in models in which individuals are making labor/leisure decisions. The analysis shows how individuals' decisions are affected by the aggregate income distribution and how the concern for ...
Quarterly Review , Volume 19 , Issue Sum , Pages 12-21