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Discussion Paper
Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency
Evidence from a 160-year-long panel of U.S. banks suggests that the ultimate cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always a deterioration of bank fundamentals that leads to insolvency. As described in our previous post, bank failures—including those that involve bank runs—are typically preceded by a slow deterioration of bank fundamentals and are hence remarkably predictable. In this final post of our three-part series, we relate the findings discussed previously to theories of bank failures, and we discuss the policy implications of our findings.
Working Paper
Supervising Failing Banks
This paper studies the role of banking supervision in anticipating, monitoring, and disciplining failing banks. We document that supervisors anticipate most bank failures with a high degree of accuracy. Supervisors play an important role in requiring troubled banks to recognize losses, taking enforcement actions, and ultimately closing failing banks. To establish causality, we exploit exogenous variation in supervisory strictness during the Global Financial Crisis. Stricter supervision leads to more loss recognition, reduced dividend payouts, and an increase in the likelihood and speed of ...
Working Paper
Employment Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy : Evidence from QE
This paper investigates the effect of the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policy on employment via a bank lending channel. We find that banks with higher mortgage-backed securities holdings issued relatively more loans after the first and third rounds of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3). While additional volume is concentrated in refinanced mortgages after QE1, increases are driven by newly originated home purchase mortgages and additional commercial and industrial lending after QE3. Using spatial variation, we show that regions with a high share of affected banks experienced ...
Discussion Paper
How (Un-)Informed Are Depositors in a Banking Panic? A Lesson from History
How informed or uninformed are bank depositors in a banking crisis? Can depositors anticipate which banks will fail? Understanding the behavior of depositors in financial crises is key to evaluating the policy measures, such as deposit insurance, designed to prevent them. But this is difficult in modern settings. The fact that bank runs are rare and deposit insurance universal implies that it is rare to be able to observe how depositors would behave in absence of the policy. Hence, as empiricists, we are lacking the counterfactual of depositor behavior during a run that is undistorted by the ...
Discussion Paper
A New Public Data Source: Call Reports from 1959 to 2025
Call Reports are regulatory filings in which commercial banks report their assets, liabilities, income, and other information. They are one of the most-used data sources in banking and finance. In this post, we describe a new dataset made available on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website that contains time-consistent balance sheets and income statements for commercial banks in the United States from 1959 to 2025.
Discussion Paper
Inflating Away the Debt: The Debt-Inflation Channel of German Hyperinflation
The recent rise in price pressures around the world has reignited interest in understanding how inflation transmits to the real economy. Economists have long recognized that unexpected surges of inflation can redistribute wealth from creditors to debtors when debt contracts are written in nominal terms (see, for example, Fisher 1933). If debtors are financially constrained, this redistribution can affect real economic activity by relaxing financing constraints. This mechanism, which we call the debt-inflation channel, is well understood theoretically (for example, Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid ...
Discussion Paper
test anna templatetype feb 14 Once Upon a Time in the Banking Sector: Historical Insights into Banking Competition
How does competition among banks affect credit growth and real economic growth? In addition, how does it affect financial stability? In this blog post, we derive insights into this important set of questions from novel data on the U.S. banking system during the nineteenth century.
Working Paper
Did QE Lead Banks to Relax Their Lending Standards? Evidence from the Federal Reserve's LSAPs
Using confidential loan officer survey data on lending standards and internal risk ratings on loans, we document an effect of large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) on lending standards and risk-taking. We exploit cross-sectional variation in banks? holdings of mortgage-backed securities to show that the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) significantly lowered lending standards and increased loan risk characteristics. The magnitude of the effects is about the same in QE1 and QE3, and is comparable to the effect of a one percentage point decrease in the Fed funds ...
Discussion Paper
Weathering the Storm: Who Can Access Credit in a Pandemic?
Credit enables firms to weather temporary disruptions in their business that may impair their cash flow and limit their ability to meet commitments to suppliers and employees. The onset of the COVID recession sparked a massive increase in bank credit, largely driven by firms drawing on pre-committed credit lines. In this post, which is based on a recent Staff Report, we investigate which firms were able to tap into bank credit to help sustain their business over the ensuing downturn.
Report
Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?
We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to study whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and non-financial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits decline almost exclusively for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that while regular depositors are uninformed, banks have precise information about which banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing ...