Search Results
Working Paper
Stress tests and information disclosure
Superseded by Working Paper 15-10. We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator who has information about banks? ability to overcome future liquidity shocks. We focus on the following trade-off: Disclosing some information may be necessary to prevent a market breakdown, but disclosing too much information destroys risk-sharing opportunities (Hirshleifer effect). We find that during normal times, no disclosure is optimal, but during bad times, partial disclosure is optimal. We characterize the optimal form of this partial disclosure. We also relate our results to the debate on the ...
Working Paper
Why do markets freeze?
Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted, such a transaction is subject to a severe adverse selection problem: the originator has a natural information advantage and will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages. However, a second important feature of this transaction has received much less attention: both the seller and the buyer may have existing inventories of mortgages similar to those being sold. The authors analyze how the presence of such inventories affects trade. They use their model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in ...
Working Paper
Courts and contractual innovation: a preliminary analysis
The authors explore a model in which agents enter into a contract but are uncertain about how a judge will enforce it. The judge can consider a wide range of evidence, or instead, use a rule-based method of judgment that relies on limited information. The authors focus on the following tradeoff: Considering a wide range of evidence increases the likelihood of a correct ruling in the case at hand but undermines the formation of precedents that resolve legal uncertainty for subsequent agents. ; In a model of contractual innovation, they show that the use of evidence increases the likelihood of ...
Journal Article
Liquidity and exchanges, or contracting with the producers
Yaron Leitner discusses liquidity, a desirable feature of a well-functioning market. In "Liquidity and Exchanges, or Contracting with the Producers," Leitner explains how exchanges can provide liquidity. He also discusses his recent research, which explains some contractual problems that may arise in very liquid markets, as well as the potential role of an exchange in overcoming these problems.
Working Paper
Market run-ups, market freezes, and leverage
The authors study trade between a buyer and a seller when both may have existing inventories of assets similar to those being traded. They analyze how these inventories affect trade, information dissemination, and price formation. The authors show that when the buyer's and seller's initial leverage is moderate, inventories increase price and trade volume, but when leverage is high, trade may become impossible (a "market freeze"). Their analysis predicts a pattern of trade in which prices and trade volume first increase, and then markets break down. The authors use their model to discuss ...
Working Paper
Stress tests and information disclosure
Supersedes Working Paper 13-26 . We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator that has information about banks? ability to overcome future liquidity shocks. We focus on the following tradeoff: Disclosing some information may be necessary to prevent a market breakdown, but disclosing too much information destroys risk-sharing opportunities (the Hirshleifer effect). We find that during normal times, no disclosure is optimal, but during bad times, partial disclosure is optimal. We characterize the optimal form of this partial disclosure. We relate our results to the Bayesian persuasion ...
Working Paper
Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary
When contracts are unobserved, agents may have the incentive to promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. The author constructs an optimal mechanism that induces agents to reveal all their trades voluntarily. The mechanism allows agents to report every contract they enter, and it makes public the names of agents who have reached some prespecified position limit. In some cases, an agent's position limit must be higher than the number of contracts he enters in equilibrium. The mechanism has some features of a clearinghouse. ; Supersedes Working Paper 09-10
Journal Article
Stock prices and business investment
Is there a link between the stock market and business investment? Empirical evidence indicates that there is. A firm tends to invest more when its stock price increases, and it tends to invest less when the price falls. In ?Stock Prices and Business Investment,? Yaron Leitner discusses existing research that explains this relationship. One question under consideration is whether the stock market actually improves investment decisions.
Journal Article
Why do markets freeze?
In normal times, investors buy and sell financial assets because there are gains from trade. However, markets do not always function properly ? they sometimes ?freeze.? An example is the collapse of trading in mortgage-backed securities during the recent financial crisis. Why does trade break down despite the potential gains from trade? Can the government intervene to restore the normal functioning of markets? In ?Why Do Markets Freeze?,? Yaron Leitner explains what a market freeze is and some of the theories as to why these freezes occur.
Journal Article
Nontraditional Insurance and Risks to Financial Stability
Do insurance companies pose a threat to financial stability? Historically, the answer has been no. But the insurance industry?s expansion into nontraditional activities has prompted reconsideration.