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Author:Lee, Michael Junho 

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Zero Settlement Risk Token Systems

How might modern settlement systems with distributed ledger technology achieve zero settlement risk? We consider the design of settlement systems that satisfies two integral features: information-leakage proof and zero settlement risk. Legacy settlement systems partition private information but are vulnerable to settlement fails. A token system with dynamic ownership representation, or a dynamic ledger, can be designed to achieve both, as long as it employs a protocol that enforces two restrictions: programs must be immediately implemented and must involve transactions based on verifiable ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1120

Discussion Paper
How Does Information Affect Liquidity in Over-the-Counter Markets?

A large volume of financial transactions occur in decentralized markets that commonly depend on a network of dealers. Dealers face two impediments to providing liquidity in these markets. First, dealers may face informed traders. Second, they may face costs associated with maintaining large balance sheets, either due to inventory or liquidity costs. In a recent paper, we study a model of over-the-counter (OTC) markets in which liquidity is endogenously determined by dealers who must contend with both asymmetric information and liquidity costs. This post provides an intuitive explanation of ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20200113

Discussion Paper
An Interoperability Framework for Payment Systems

Novel payment systems based on blockchain networks promise to redesign financial architecture, but a notable concern about these systems is whether they can be made interoperable. This concern stems from the concept of the “singleness of money”—that payments and exchange are not subject to volatility in the value of the money itself. Volatility and speculation can arise from the payment medium, which may have speculative characteristics, or from frictions that undermine the ability of one or more payments systems to interoperate. In this two-part series, we outline a framework for ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20250327a

Discussion Paper
Insider Networks

Modern-day financial systems are highly complex, with billions of exchanges in information, assets, and funds between individuals and institutions. Though daunting to operationalize, regulating these transmissions may be desirable in some instances. For example, securities regulators aim to protect investors by tracking and punishing insider trading. Recent evidence shows that insiders have formed sophisticated networksthat enable them to pursue activities outside the purview of regulatory oversight. In understanding the cat-and-mouse game between regulators and insiders, a key consideration ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20200625

Report
Regulating Decentralized Systems: Evidence from Sanctions on Tornado Cash

Blockchain-based systems are run by a decentralized network of participants and are designed to be censorship-resistant. We use sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of Treasury on Tornado Cash (TC), a smart contract protocol, to study the impact and effectiveness of regulation in decentralized systems. We document an immediate and lasting impact on TC following the sanction announcement, measured by market reaction, transaction volume, and diversity of users. Still, net flows into TC contracts recover to and surpass pre-announcement levels for most pools, supporting viability of TC. ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1112

Discussion Paper
Why Central Bank Digital Currencies?

In the past year, a number of central banks have stepped up work on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs – see map). For central banks, are CBDCs just a defensive reaction to private-sector innovations in money, or are they an opportunity for the monetary system? In this post, we consider several long-standing goals of central banks in their support and provision of retail payments, why and how central banks tackle these issues, and where CBDCs fit into the array of potential solutions.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20211201

Discussion Paper
The Future of Payments Is Not Stablecoins

Stablecoins, which we define as digital assets used as a medium of exchange that are purported to be backed by assets held specifically for that purpose, have grown considerably in the last two years. They rose from a market capitalization of $5.7 billion on December 1, 2019, to $155.6 billion on January 21, 2022. Moreover, a market that was once dominated by a single stablecoin—Tether (USDT)—now boasts five stablecoins with valuations over $1 billion (as of January 21, 2022; data about the supply of stablecoins can be found here). Analysts have started to pay increased attention to the ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20220207

Discussion Paper
What Is Atomic Settlement?

Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) have garnered growing interest in recent years and are making inroads into traditional finance. One purported benefit of DLTs is their ability to bring about “atomic” settlement. Indeed, several recent private sector projects (SDX, Fnality, HQLAx) aim to do just that. But what exactly is atomic settlement? In this post, we explain that atomic settlement, as it is often defined, combines two distinct properties: instant settlement and simultaneous settlement, which should be kept separate.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20221107

Discussion Paper
What Makes Cryptocurrencies Different?

Permissionless blockchains, which support the most popular cryptocurrency networks like Bitcoin and Ethereum, have shown that it is possible to transfer value without relying on centralized trusted third parties, something that is new and remarkable (although perhaps most clearly useful for less developed financial markets). What makes permissionless blockchains able to transfer value without relying on a small number of trusted third parties is the combination of several components that all need to work together. The components themselves are not particularly new, but the combination of ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20230816

Report
Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets

Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1121

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