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Working Paper
Globalization of production and the technology transfer paradox
This paper develops a growth model aimed at understanding the effects of globalization of production on rate of innovation, distribution of labor income between the North and South and welfare of workers in both regions. We adopt a dynamic general equilibrium product cycle model, assuming that the North specializes in innovation and the South specializes in imitation. Globalization of production resulting from trade liberalization and imitation of the North?s technology by the South increases the rate of innovation. When the South?s participation in the product cycle is not too deep, further ...
Report
Conference on globalization, political economy and trade policy
On April 24 and 25, 2009, the Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute joined with Southern Methodist University to cosponsor a conference on Globalization, Political Economy and Trade Policy at SMU?s Collins Executive Education Center. Nine scholarly papers were presented and discussed in three sessions.
Discussion Paper
The international product cycle and globalization of production
This paper develops a growth model aimed at understanding the potential effects of globalization of production on rate of innovation, distribution of skilled labor income between the North and South, and welfare of skilled workers in both regions. We adopt a dynamic general equilibrium product-cycle model, assuming that the North specializes in innovation and the South specializes in imitation. Globalization of production resulting from trade liberalization and imitation of the North's technology by the South increases the rate of innovation. In the initial stage of globalization of ...
Journal Article
Intellectual property protection in a globalizing era
Working Paper
The most-favored nation rule in club enlargement negotiation
We study the effects of the Most-Favored Nation rule in an applicant's negotiation to join a club. When the applicant has to carry out a series of bilateral bargains with the existing members, we find that there are two effects of the MFN rule, viz. the hardened bargainer effect and the free-rider effect. The former effect tends to favor the applicant, while the latter effect tends to hurt the applicant. We find that the free-rider effect is stronger the more asymmetric are the members. The hardened bargainer effect is stronger the larger is the "size of the pie." As the number of members ...