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Journal Article
Understanding monetary policy implementation
The Federal Reserve implements its monetary policy objectives by intervening in the interbank market for overnight loans. In particular, it aims to change the supply of reserves available to commercial banks so that the (average) interest rate in this market equals an announced target rate. A recent change in legislation will give the Federal Reserve greater flexibility in this process by allowing it to pay interest on reserve balances. Together, the change and recent events in financial markets have renewed interest in the process of monetary policy implementation. This article presents a ...
Journal Article
Dollarization as a monetary arrangement for emerging market economies
Official dollarization refers to the adoption of the U.S. dollar as legal tender in place of the national currency. Some Latin American countries have recently dollarized, and others have seriously considered dollarization. This article discusses the reasons behind the surge of interest in dollarization and provides a review of the new academic literature on the topic. It discusses in detail some of the factors that are commonly considered to be the important costs and benefits of dollarizing. The paper also provides an analysis of the existing liability dollarization in several countries and ...
Report
Bailouts and financial fragility
How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a ?bailout? distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting ...
Journal Article
Divorcing money from monetary policy
Many central banks implement monetary policy in a way that maintains a tight link between the stock of money and the short-term interest rate. In particular, their implementation procedures require that the supply of reserve balances be set precisely in order to implement the target interest rate. Because bank reserves play other key roles in the economy, this link can create tensions with other important objectives, especially in times of acute market stress. This article considers an alternative approach to monetary policy implementation -- known as a "floor system" -- that can reduce ...
Working Paper
Optimal Banking Contracts and Financial Fragility
We study a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation in which the bank and all depositors observe withdrawals as they occur. We derive the constrained efficient allocation of resources in closed form and show that this allocation provides liquidity insurance to depositors. The contractual arrangement that decentralizes this allocation resembles a standard bank deposit in that it has a demand able debt-like structure. When withdrawals are unusually high, however,depositors who withdraw relatively late experience significant losses. This contractual ...
Report
Why are banks holding so many excess reserves?
The quantity of reserves in the U.S. banking system has risen dramatically since September 2008. Some commentators have expressed concern that this pattern indicates that the Federal Reserve's liquidity facilities have been ineffective in promoting the flow of credit to firms and households. Others have argued that the high level of reserves will be inflationary. We explain, through a series of examples, why banks are currently holding so many reserves. The examples show how the quantity of bank reserves is determined by the size of the Federal Reserve's policy initiatives and in no way ...
Report
Commitment and equilibrium bank runs
We study the role of commitment in a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with no aggregate uncertainty. As is well known, the banking authority can eliminate the possibility of a bank run by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start. We show, however, that in an environment without commitment, the banking authority will choose to only partially suspend payments during a run. In some cases, the reduction in early payouts under this partial suspension is insufficient to dissuade depositors from participating in the run. Bank runs can then occur with positive ...
Discussion Paper
Cash Assets of Foreign Banks: An Example of Seasonal Adjustment Gone Awry
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.8 provides aggregate data on the assets and liabilities of commercial banks in the United States. Two types of data are provided: one in which each series is adjusted to offset regular, seasonal movements, and another in which no adjustment is made. Recently, a striking pattern has emerged in one particular data series: the cash assets of foreign-related banking institutions.[1] In the seasonally adjusted data, this value has fallen 36 percent since its peak in June 2011?a sharp movement that has generated concern among market observers. The nonseasonally ...
Journal Article
Stability of funding models: an analytical framework
With the recent financial crisis, many financial intermediaries experienced strains created by declining asset values and a loss of funding sources. In reviewing these stress events, one notices that some arrangements appear to have been more stable?that is, better able to withstand shocks to their asset values and/or funding sources?than others. Because the precise determinants of this stability are not well understood, gaining a better grasp of them is a critical task for market participants and policymakers as they try to design more resilient arrangements and improve financial regulation. ...
Report
Run equilibria in a model of financial intermediation
We study the Green and Lin (2003) model of financial intermediation with two new features: traders may face a cost of contacting the intermediary, and consumption needs may be correlated across traders. We show that each feature is capable of generating an equilibrium in which some (but not all) traders ?run? on the intermediary by withdrawing their funds at the first opportunity regardless of their true consumption needs. Our results also provide some insight into elements of the economic environment that are necessary for a run equilibrium to exist in general models of financial ...