Search Results
Journal Article
The regulation of bank entry
Working Paper
Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking
A fixed-rate deposit insurance system provides a moral hazard for excessive risk taking and is not viable absent regulation. Although the deposit insurance system appears to have worked remarkably well over most of its 50-year history, major problems began to appear in the early 1980s. This paper addresses the puzzle of why major problems began to arise in the early 1980s and not sooner. ; The hypothesis is that increases in competition caused bank charter values to decline, which, in turn, caused banks to- increase default risk through increases. in asset risk and reductions in capital. This ...
Journal Article
Interest checking and M1
Journal Article
Unemployment vs. employment
Journal Article
States take the lead
Journal Article
Subordinated debt as bank capital
Conference Paper
Competition for MMDAs
Conference Paper
Bank capital regulation in the 1980s: effective or ineffective?
Conference Paper
Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking