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Discussion Paper
Primary Dealer Participation in the Secondary U.S. Treasury Market
The recent Joint Staff Report on October 15, 2014, exploring an episode of unprecedented volatility in the U.S. Treasury market, revealed that primary dealers no longer account for most trading volume on the interdealer brokerage (IDB) platforms. This shift is noteworthy because dealers contribute to long-term liquidity provision via their willingness to hold positions across days. However, a large share of Treasury security trading occurs elsewhere, in the dealer-to-customer (DtC) market. In this post, we show that primary dealers maintain a majority share of secondary market trading volume ...
Discussion Paper
What’s behind the March Spike in Treasury Fails?
U.S. Treasury security settlement fails—whereby market participants are unable to make delivery of securities to complete transactions—spiked in March 2016 to their highest level since the financial crisis. As noted in this post, fails delay the settlement of transactions and can therefore lead to illiquidity, create operational risk, and increase counterparty credit risk. Fails in the Treasury market attract particular attention because of the market’s key role for global investors as a pricing benchmark, hedging instrument, and reserve asset. So what drove the March spike? In this ...
Discussion Paper
Breaking Down TRACE Volumes Further
Following an earlier joint FEDS Note and Liberty Street Economics blog post that examined aggregate trading volume in the Treasury cash market across venues, this post looks at volume across security type, seasoned-ness (time since issuance), and maturity. The analysis, which again relies on transactions recorded in the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's (FINRA) Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), sheds light on perceptions that some Treasury securities—in particular those that are off-the-run—may not trade very actively. We confirm that most trading volume is made up of ...
Journal Article
The Term Securities Lending Facility: origin, design, and effects
The Federal Reserve launched the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) in 2008 to promote liquidity in the funding markets and improve the operation of the broader financial markets. The facility increases the ability of dealers to obtain cash in the private market by enabling them to pledge securities temporarily as collateral for Treasuries, which are relatively easy to finance. The TSLF thus reduces the need for dealers to sell assets into illiquid markets as well as lessens the likelihood of a loss of confidence among lenders.
Journal Article
Securities loans collateralized by cash: reinvestment risk, run risk, and incentive issues
Securities loans collateralized by cash are by far the most popular form of securities-lending transaction. But when the cash collateral associated with these transactions is actively reinvested by a lender?s agent, potential risks emerge. This study argues that the standard compensation scheme for securities-lending agents, which typically provides for agents to share in gains but not losses, creates incentives for them to take excessive risk. It also highlights the need for greater scrutiny and understanding of cash reinvestment practices?especially in light of the AIG experience, which ...
Report
Dealer Capacity and U.S. Treasury Market Functionality
We show a significant loss in U.S. Treasury market functionality when intensive use of dealer balance sheets is needed to intermediate bond markets, as in March 2020. Although yield volatility explains most of the variation in Treasury market liquidity over time, when dealer balance sheet utilization reaches sufficiently high levels, liquidity is much worse than predicted by yield volatility alone. This is consistent with the existence of occasionally binding constraints on the intermediation capacity of bond markets.
Discussion Paper
What Explains the June Spike in Treasury Settlement Fails?
In June of this year?as we noted in the preceding post?settlement fails in U.S. Treasury securities spiked to their highest level since the implementation of the fails charge in May 2009. Our first post reviewed what fails are, why they arise, and how they can be measured. In this post, we dig into the fails data to identify possible explanations for the high level of fails in June. We observe that sequential fails of several benchmark securities accounted for the lion?s share of fails in June, but that fails in seasoned securities?which have been trending upward for some time?were also ...
Journal Article
Price risk intermediation in the over-the-counter derivatives markets: interpretation of a global survey
In April 1995, central banks in twenty-six countries conducted a global survey of the financial derivatives markets' size and structure. The authors' analysis of the survey results suggests that at the time of the survey, dealers in the aggregate assumed only small exposures to price risks in meeting end-user demands. In addition, despite the derivatives markets' large size, potential price shocks there would still be appreciably smaller in scale than price shocks in the cash markets. Thus, the overall effect of derivatives markets may be to modify and redistribute exposures to price risks in ...
Journal Article
Mortgage refinancing and the concentration of mortgage coupons
Because of the concentrated distribution of interest rates on outstanding mortgages, modest interest rate declines in 1997 and 1998 made refinancing a smart choice for a record number of homeowners. In addition, the strong economy and the age of mortgage loans likely contributed to the surge in refinancing activity.