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Author:Karaivanov, Alexander K. 

Working Paper
Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic risk-sharing contracts between profit-maximizing insurers and risk-averse agents who face idiosyncratic income uncertainty and may self-insure through savings. We study Markov-perfect insurance contracts in which neither party can commit beyond the current period. We show that the limited commitment assumption on the insurer's side is only restrictive when he is endowed with a rate of return advantage and the agent has sufficiently large initial assets. In such a case, the consumption profile is distorted relative to the first-best. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, ...
Working Papers , Paper 2011-029

Working Paper
Markov-Perfect Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment

We define, characterize and compute Markov-perfect risk-sharing contracts in a dynamic stochastic economy with endogenous asset accumulation and simultaneous limited commitment and moral hazard frictions. We prove that Markov-perfect insurance contracts preserve standard properties of optimal insurance with private information and are not more restrictive than a long-term contract with one-sided commitment. Markov-perfect contracts imply a determinate asset time-path and a non-degenerate long-run stationary wealth distribution. We show numerically that Markov-perfect contracts provide sizably ...
Working Papers , Paper 2011-030

Journal Article
Market Power and Asset Contractibility in Dynamic Insurance Contracts

The authors study the roles of asset contractibility, market power, and rate of return differentials in dynamic insurance when the contracting parties have limited commitment. They define, characterize, and compute Markov-perfect risk-sharing contracts with bargaining. These contracts significantly improve consumption smoothing and welfare relative to self-insurance through savings. Incorporating savings decisions into the contract (asset contractibility) implies sizable gains for both the insurers and the insured. The size and distribution of these gains depend critically on the insurers? ...
Review , Volume 98 , Issue 2

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