Search Results
Working Paper
Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review
We study short-term and medium-term changes in bank risk-taking as a result of supervision, and the associated real effects. For identification, we exploit the European Central Bank's asset-quality review (AQR) in conjunction with security and credit registers. After the AQR announcement, reviewed banks reduce riskier securities and credit supply, with the greatest effect on riskiest securities. We find negative spillovers on asset prices and firm-level credit availability. Moreover, non-banks with higher exposure to reviewed banks acquire the shed risk. After the AQR compliance, reviewed ...
Discussion Paper
Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis : Part I, Repo Runs
This is the first of two notes that empirically document the behavior of U.S. Primary Dealers during the 2007-08 financial crisis. In this note we show that dealers' exposure to risky assets drives the observed repo funding squeeze; moreover, as evident from Lehman's experience, we show that repos become subject to counterparty risk during periods of stress, even when collateralized by the safest assets.
Discussion Paper
The Systemic Nature of Settlement Fails
In this note we analyze the systemic nature of settlement fails – the failure to deliver the agreed upon securities – during the 2007-09 period. Large and protracted settlement fails are believed to undermine the liquidity and well-functioning of securities markets, and as a result market groups and policymakers have tried to limit them.
Discussion Paper
Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis : Part II, Intermediation and Deleveraging
In this second of two notes we study how dealers deleverage following the 2007-2008 funding squeeze.
Working Paper
The Rise of Shadow Banking : Evidence from Capital Regulation
We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention and nonbanks step in, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce. This reallocation has important spillovers: ...