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Working Paper
Measuring efficiency when market prices are subject to adverse selection
In perfectly competitive markets, prices aggregate inputs and outputs into a money metric that allows production plans to be ranked by their profitability. When informational asymmetries in competitive markets lead to adverse selection, prices in these markets assume an additional role that conveys information about product quality. In the case of banking production, quality is linked to risk because prices are linked to credit quality. ; The problem of efficiency measurement is complicated by the additional role because quality varies with price and price is a decision variable of firms ...
Working Paper
Who said large banks don't experience scale economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function
Earlier studies found little evidence of scale economies at large banks; later studies using data from the 1990s uncovered such evidence, providing a rationale for very large banks seen worldwide. Using more recent data, the authors estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard risk-neutral model finds little evidence of scale economies. The model using more general risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking finds large scale economies. The authors show that these economies are not driven by too-big-to-fail considerations. They evaluate the cost implications of breaking ...
Working Paper
Is Bigger Necessarily Better in Community Banking?
SIPERSEDED BY WP 18-11 We investigate the relative performance of publicly traded community banks (those with assets less than $10 billion) versus larger banks (those with assets between $10 billion and $50 billion). A body of research has shown that community banks have potential advantages in relationship lending compared with large banks, although newer research suggests that these advantages may be shrinking. In addition, the burdens placed on community banks by the regulatory reforms mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the need to increase ...
Conference Paper
Estimating managers' utility-maximizing demand for agency goods
An empirical model of managers? demand for agency goods is derived and estimated using the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (AER 1980). As in Jensen and Meckling (JFE 1976), we derive managers? demand for agency goods by maximizing a managerial utility function where managers allocate the potential value of their firm?s assets to the consumption of agency goods and the production of market value (which, given their ownership stake, determines their wealth). The utility function is defined over wealth and the value of agency goods and is conditioned on managers? holdings of ...
Conference Paper
Evidence on the objectives of bank managers
Working Paper
Measuring the efficiency of capital allocation in commercial banking
Commercial banks leverage their equity capital with demandable debt that participates in the economy's payments system. The distinctive nature of this debt generates an unusual degree of liquidity risk that can, at times, threaten the payments system. To reduce this threat, insurance protects deposits; and to reduce the moral hazard problems of the debt contract and deposit insurance, bank regulation constrains risk-taking and defines standards of capital adequacy. The inherent liquidity risk of demandable debt as well as potential regulatory penalties for poor financial performance creates ...
Working Paper
Bank managers' objectives
Conference Paper
Recovering banking technologies when managers are not risk-neutral.
Conference Paper
Measuring the efficiency of capital allocation in commercial banking